

CONFIDENTIAL CONFERENCE NOTES

QUNO conference in Rougemont, 1-4 May 1991

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Matthew MESELSON

ACDA Director Ronald Lehman, speaking at a Senate breakfast a few weeks ago [in fact on 6 March, one of the CSIS CW series], had said of the CWC that the expectation now is that the major issues will be resolved in 1991, the treaty becoming ready for signature in 1992.

The Kuwait crisis had raised CW to the highest levels of political attention. In America the result had not been an affirmation of the policy of retaliation in kind: that was an actual high-level decision. Underlying it there was, most probably, a decision against using CW in response to Iraqi use of CW.

Paul O'SULLIVAN [Australian CD ambassador]

CWC as metaphor for Middle East comprehensive regional settlement

The CWC could be ready for signature in Spring 1992, given the emergence of a package deal from the security basket (WG-A), the verification basket (WG-B) and the organizational basket (WG-C).

As to verification there were two main problem areas: controlling civil industry -- will probably be resolved along lines of Swedish proposal on processes; and challenge inspections under Art IX -- a Western problem this, stemming from US reluctance to stick to its 1984 proposal; but in 2 weeks time the Western Group will probably agree a proposal.

As to the organization, the problems of structure, financing, powers &c are difficult to resolve, but most likely will be at the projected ministerial-level CD meeting, which looks like happening in November or December.

He spoke of regional activities, including the projected multilateral trial inspection in which an FRG airbase near Frankfurt is soon to be inspected by a team from Egypt, Argentina, Pakistan and Iran.

[Responding to TAYLOR] On tear gases his hunch is that they will be excluded from the scope of the CWC because there is no consensus in sight on including them.

[Responding to LEVITE] Joining the CWC will give access to penetrant-defeating technology.

Yair EVRON

Confirmed a comment of ROGOV's in which the latter, questioning MESELSON's downplaying of CW-weapons utility, had said that Israelis were worried about the ability of Syrian CW weapons to slow down the mobilization process.

Ahmed KHALIDI

If Iraq had not used CW in the war, when would it ever again be used? Is the CW threat not one more of perception and irrational fear than of reality?

Ariel LEVITE

Asked whether we were not underestimating the power and value of CW weapons. He spoke of a just-done study of impact of CW on Israeli population given results of Iraqi Scud attacks. This study showed that simultaneous HE attacks could greatly increase power of CW. Evaluation of the Scud attacks had shown that "people are remarkably resistant to HE"

Hussein TOGA

During Secretary Baker's pre-war talks with Tariq Aziz, the US side had brought up CW six times, warning of the dire consequences that could follow Iraqi resort to it. The threat was of nuclear retaliation [MESELSON later disputed this in private; his information was that the US threat had been occupation of Baghdad]