

He stopped off on his way back from an Aspen/Berlin meeting on the Future of Arms Control (or some such). Stayed in Egerton Gdns and Sx Sq.

- 1) He will copy to me the participation list at the Aspen meeting. He had given a presentation on CW (the only such); had copied to all participants my 1985 Annual Review in its 29 Jan 86 draft.
- 2) At Aspen, the two Brits--Pauline Neville-Jones and John Roper--had both been strongly against CW rearmt, though untutoredly. The really interesting comments were those of the Russian: Col G Batenin, a General Staff officer, archetypically military.
- 3) Batenin had begun by summarizing the latest Sov proposals (going beyond, in detail, anything Matt had previously heard, or I): (a) 'production bases' would be declared; (b) the capacities of the production bases would be declared; (c) exactly how the production bases were to be eliminated was a matter for negotiation; and (d) there would be OSI of the factories being eliminated.
- 4) Batenin then summarized the previous difficulties, in general terms, namely: (a) declaration of the capacities of production factories, and (b) OSI of factories so declared. But these were now no longer difficulties. There was now only one outstanding major difference between USA and USSR: (c) the inspection on challenge of 'remainders' (i.e. things not declared).
- 5) Batenin wished to assure participants that, in the Warsaw Pact, only one country had CW weapons. And wished to give assurance that both the military and the political leadership in the USSR was well prepared to negotiate with the USA on this problem. Outside the USSR, there are no CW weapons in the Soviet bloc. There are no CW weapons on EE soil; confirmed, in response to a specific question, that this meant the GDR too.
- 6) Dwelt further on the US/SU difference on inspection, differentiating two kinds of inspection. The first concerned means of production. He stated that within 30 days of EIF, production was to cease, and that there would be OSI that production had indeed ceased. The second had to do with challenge inspections.
- 7) MSM and I chatted a bit about the 'open invitation' scheme: was it or was it not a killer provision? There was a 'useful inequality': for a given site, fewer visits would be needed for arms-control assurance purposes than for espionage purposes: maybe Perlé had in fact discovered an important new principle. It was a killer if it proved infeasible, of course. Maybe this was what the IEWSS CBW project should be looking at.
- 8) Seems that MSM is not to be invited to the June Aspen/Berlin CW meeting; Joe Nye (the US convenor) is apparently being pressured on this by John Deutch
- 9) Gloss on that 1980 H Brown et al meeting: after it, someone who knows about such things cautioned Matt to be careful about interpreting 'chemicals' (at that GDR airbase): didn't necessarily mean chemical munitions; maybe hulk agent.
- 10) The assessment that there are no Soviet stocks of CW weapons outside the USSR agrees with the current CIA briefing on the subject.

- 11) The 1980 DSB report (Deutch) specifies 8000 - 9000 agent yons as being the binary requirement.
- 12) There are no 105-mm TCMS in Germany; the stockpile was built up, in the late 1960s, solely on considered requirements.
- 13) The 155-mm GB2 requirement is around 1.2M rounds.

#### Yellow Rain

14) Had been told, on completely credible authority, that Rick Burt had asked Casey, back in the beginning, to provide him with all YR intelligence. Casey agreed, perhaps as a device for circumventing the Agency.

15) He checked through my MemCons with him of 28-29/11/84, 27-29/4/85, 1/5/85, 28/6/85, 12/7/85, 29-30/10/85 and 30/10/85 (London). I said I would send him copies of the revised versions.

16) He had called Tom INCH on his way through London to Berlin (i.e. on 7 Feb). Tom had told him that the Porton paper was now issued, but didn't expect any action. But he, Tom, would be seeing his Comptroller soon and would raise the matter with him then.

17) MSM had called Robin Black on 14 Feb (during our lunch with Andrea Crossland). MSM told me of three points:

(a) There were in fact several UK reports on YR now. But there would probably be no further CDE activity.

(b) MSM got the impression that the New Hampshire round robin had shown that Mirocha was capable of false positives.

(c) Because Robin said he had been 'greatly disappointed' by two parts of Mirocha's Sci Amer letter--i.e., (presumably) he knew that Mirocha was lying in it on two counts. (NB: could be important to flush out more about Mirocha's performance in the round robin: Tom Dashiell, a close buddy of Tom Inch's and who knows everything about YR, would be the route).

18) MSM and Jean G had recently had lunch (at a Macdonalds in Virginia) with a friend of Bill Garrett's (National Geographic), a CIA person in his 40s, name of Williams. Williams had been in Laos since about 1961. Confirmed that all sorts of foul skuldiggery did indeed happen, meaning that the dark-side stories would be entirely in keeping. He recalled having seen whole Lao villages dead--but of typhoid from the water.

19) It is apparently such stories of dead villages which is what people who have been given the super-secret YR briefings find impressive. Does this not mean (MSM speculated) that the secret bit of the intelligence picture comes from Humint in Laos--pres of Western or US teams there sending back such reports. But what they would be sending back would, if so, inevitably be intrinsically ambiguous--or susceptible to dark-side manipulation.

20) That BEC person--David Taylor--has been putting a lot of work into Jerry Barker Daniels; got lots of stuff from Missoula.

20a) Phil Hiltz (who may not actually write a book on YR) says he has a thousand FoIA papers on YR now.

20b) It is really Bob M who is the overlord of the interagency YR work, and ~~xi~~ long has been, notwithstanding that organogram with Kit Green at the centre.

Other

21) MSM feels that this is the year of the CW treaty. We should now make a big push, esp after Gorbachev's 15 Jan release. Need for a network of senior Western pro-CWC folk (was this something he had discussed during his 13 Feb meet with Zuckerman?). Agreement could be reached quite quickly, if high-level will was there; ridiculous to think it was bad to leave details for subsequent negotiation after agreements in principle had been registered.

22) He has a strong sense of enemies in high places. The Ambrose proposal that he review Edgewood's programmes had not been followed up; his clearances had not come through; and the projected day-long meeting in November with Welch and Stringer had been cancelled by a phone call from some major.

23) Chuck Flowerree. Very woolly minded after MSMS had given him his YR briefing: a committed believer, which surprised MSM. Has an office in State still. Would probably do a (good) hatchet job on EuroCWFZ for SIPRI. Lives in Rectortown, Virginia (tel 703-364-1588). Office tel is 202-647-9271.

24) I should send Matt any Palme Commission stuff I have on the genesis of their EuroCWFZ proposal.

25) I should send him anything I have about US, Can & legal appraisals of the feasibility of the open-invitation scheme.

26) We talked of the IEWSS project. Two suggestions:

(a) A history of the evolution of national CWD negotiating positions in order to identify how far apart the two sides really are. Good way of exploiting all the ex-Ambassadors around, Summerhayes et al.

(b) Feasibility of mandatory challenge inspections.

Important, given the new favourable climate, that the project should create something new, not just a re-stirring of the pot. Much would depend on the resources. Good if the project could create a new source of CBW expertise--a NYC SIPRI, say; the Institute could play host to briefings by CW experts--Welch, Stringer, Gold, Jacchia et al.--provided it had a good in-house person.

27) A useful paper to be written by JPPR would contrast the CIA and DIA positions of Sov CW posture.

28) I disconcerted him by referring to 'Patricia Menard' at one point in a conversation, meaning the Hong Kong journalist who had covered Daniels for the BBC, which was not her name. MSM knew PM as a CIA officer; he had noticed her name in the hotel registration book in Salisbury where CDE had put him up last year.

29) The 8-in binary programme seems to have been killed by its inability to cure the flashing problem. That was VX2. This presumably means that the M426 rounds will be retained.

30) It was only after Brandt had written to Nixon asking about location of US Stox in FRG, and Nixon replied, that he knew

31) Marletta is currently duplicating the Rosen trichoth GC/MS methodology on a set of blanks.

32) MSM will be getting involved in interviewing US Hmong re YR.