

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
THE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES
16 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

August 30, 1966

Dr. Paul Doty
Department of Chemistry
Harvard University
12 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Dear Paul:

To be sure that no confusion arises as to our plans for the CB letter, I'll put on paper what I think we have agreed to do.

1) On Thursday September 1, you will send to Donald Hornig a copy of the letter, a list of initial signers, and a copy of the three newspaper quotations we have circulated.

2) We will continue to accumulate names for the list of initial signers.

3) On or about September 15, we will distribute the letter widely in order to gather a large number of signatures of professional scientists. At the same time, we will inform the press of our effort.

4) After several weeks have passed, we will formally transmit the letter to the President, along with the names of all its signers. We may also ask for a White House interview to discuss means of reinforcing restraints on the use of CB weapons.

The main effort to gather a large number of signatures will be made through the F.A.S. Their Council has agreed to endorse and distribute the letter to its members.

I'll be back in Cambridge September 9.

As ever,



Matthew Meselson

CW 66

Dear Colleague:

The enclosed letter to President Johnson expresses our concern with policies and practices which we consider to jeopardize existing restraints on the employment of chemical and biological weapons. We urge you to join with us as co-signers and to help gather signatures of professional scientists among your colleagues.

Signatures should be forwarded by October 31, 1966 to:

Presidential Letter
58 Washington Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140

Sincerely yours,
John Edsall
Matthew Meselson

The following persons are initial signers of the letter to the President:

Felix Bloch, Department of Physics, Stanford University
Konrad E. Bloch, Department of Chemistry, Harvard University
James F. Crow, Department of Medical Genetics, University of Wisconsin
William Doering, Sterling Chemistry Laboratory, Yale University
Paul Doty, Department of Chemistry, Harvard University
Freeman J. Dyson, The Institute for Advanced Study
John T. Edsall, The Biological Laboratories, Harvard University
Bernard Feld, Department of Physics, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology
Irwin C. Gunsalus, Department of Chemistry, University of Illinois
Robert Hofstadter, Department of Physics, Stanford University
Arthur Kornberg, Department of Biochemistry, Stanford U. Medical School
Fritz Lipmann, Rockefeller Institute
Robert B. Livingston, Department of Neurosciences, U. Cal., San Diego
Matthew Meselson, Biological Laboratories, Harvard University
Severo Ochoa, New York University School of Medicine
Ray D. Owen, Division of Biology, California Institute of Technology
Keith R. Porter, Biological Laboratories, Harvard University
Charles Price, Department of Chemistry, University of Pennsylvania
Eugene Rabinowitch, Department of Botany, University of Illinois
E. L. Tatum, Rockefeller Institute
George Wald, Biological Laboratories, Harvard University
Paul Dudley White, Boston

Washington Post, Sept 20, 66

Chemical Warfare

The scientists who have petitioned the President to undertake a study of over-all Government policy regarding chemical and bacteriological warfare have made a sound suggestion. It would be a good idea to have a commission or committee go over the complicated issues involved and make national policy recommendations.

It is too bad that the scientists' petition not only asked for a study but, at the same time and in the same document, set forth some of the findings at which the study ought to arrive. That seems to be prejudicing the inquiry in advance. But the tactical error does not diminish from the wisdom of the study.

The United States has had a policy against the employment of such weapons on our initiative. But in the meantime, expenditures for research in the field have multiplied many times. And the tactical use of defoliants, crop poisons and tear gas in South Vietnam has clouded the issue and confused the policy.

Issues involved in the use of these weapons transcend the considerations that confront local commanders. Judgments as to national policy cannot be left to the exigencies of field situations. It is frequently necessary to forego the employment of means that would be locally effective if their use, subsequently, by an enemy, might involve the loss of American lives. It seems certain that it would not be to our advantage, in the long run, to break the restraints that now limit the use of these fearful devices. All of the dreadful possibilities need to be examined coolly and carefully by competent officials. Probably the historic position of the United States would be supported by the study. In that case, a restatement of American policy would help prevent the world-wide proliferation of the use of these implements.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1966.

May 15, 1966

TEAR GAS DROPPED BEFORE B-52 RAID

U.S. Explains New Tactic

WASHINGTON, Feb. 21 — Defense Department officials explained today that the new tactic of a helicopter-borne tear gas attack was designed to flush Vietcong troops out of bunkers and tunnels before the attack by B-52 bombers.

One of the past limitations of B-52 "saturation bombing" attacks was that little or no damage was done to the Vietcong troops unless a direct hit was made on a tunnel or bunker in which they were hiding. The purpose of the gas attack was to force the Vietcong troops to the surface, where they would be vulnerable to the fragmentation effects of the bomb bursts.

U.S. Spray Destroys Cong Food

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The area of crops destroyed in South Viet Nam to deny them to the Viet Cong has been significantly expanded in recent months, according to figures made available by official sources Saturday.

As of about two months ago — the latest figures available — the area covered by crop-killing herbicides was listed at slightly above 98,000 acres.

The previous total on this, as issued by the State Department on Mar. 9, was around 20,000 acres. That was said to have been the total as of last Fall. Data arriving here run behind the program, which officials said has been underway since 1962.

The 98,000 acres was estimated to be roughly 1½ percent of the total area under cultivation in South Viet Nam. Authorities said the affected lands are only in certain areas, for instance, parts of the central highlands, long under Communist control.

Food is rated here as a highly important item in the Viet Nam conflict. The United States sends food to South Viet Nam and helps farmers there boost production.

At the same time various efforts are under way to keep food from the Communist forces because, as an official put it, "in war food is as essential to the effectiveness of a military unit as its weapons and ammunition."

U.S. and South Vietnamese have seized large amounts of rice and other edibles from the Viet Cong during anti-guerrilla sweeps. Boats are used to guard harvests from foraging Communist forces.

U.S. officials said that crop destruction activities are carried out largely by American planes and equipment but are initiated by South Vietnamese authorities.

Often a South Vietnamese district or province chief wants the herbicide spread over an area of known Viet Cong occupation.

The U.S. officials also stated that the chemicals used are not dangerous to men or animals and do not prevent crops from being grown there in future years.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 16, 1963

Until a few years ago, U.S. efforts on chemical-biological weapons were minuscule. At the end of World War II spending on such research ran only \$8 million a year. This expenditure sank to \$6.5 million in 1950, at the very time the Communists were accusing this country of using germ warfare in Korea. Beginning about 1960, as U.S. policy-makers became aware of Russian strides in this field, spending began to rise significantly, to nearly \$50 million. In the fiscal year ended last June, the figure topped \$100 million and this year \$114.5 million is allocated. Alongside past efforts, this amounts to a crash program.

CW 1967

HOLD UNTIL AFTER NEWS CONFERENCE 2:00 PM Tuesday February 14, 1967
Cabinet Room, Hotel Willard, Pennsylvania Ave. and Fourteenth St., Washington, D.C.

PRESS RELEASE

U.S. SCIENTISTS ASK REVIEW OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
POLICY

More than five thousand American scientists, including seventeen Nobel Prize winners and one hundred twenty-nine members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences have sent a petition to President Johnson recommending a review of U.S. policy toward chemical and biological weapons. The petition, initiated in September and delivered to the White House today, urges a clear-cut U.S. policy of not starting the use of gas or biological weapons and requests a high-level study aimed at finding ways to maintain and reinforce world-wide restraints against chemical and biological warfare. Cautioning that the combat use of any chemical or biological weapon seriously weakens the barriers to the use of others, the scientists believe that a dangerous precedent is being set by the current large-scale use of riot gas and anti-crop chemicals by U.S. forces in Viet Nam.

In a covering letter to the President, the scientists who originated the petition cite a recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calling upon all nations to observe the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting gas and bacteriological warfare. The scientists commend the United States for supporting the United Nations resolution and recommend that the U.S. now move to ratify the Geneva Protocol. In their letter to the President, the scientists note that the United States, almost alone among the nations of the world, has not yet acceded to the Geneva Protocol.

HOLD UNTIL AFTER NEWS CONFERENCE 2:00 PM Tuesday February 14, 1967.
Cabinet Room, Hotel Willard, Pennsylvania Ave. and Fourteenth St., Washington, D.C.

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have the honor to transmit to you with this letter a petition from more than 5,000 of our professional colleagues seeking to bring to your personal attention the need to safeguard and strengthen the world-wide restraints and prohibitions against the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The reasons for our concern and some recommendations for practical measures are outlined in the petition, which bears the signatures of many of the foremost leaders in American science and medicine.

We wish at this time to note what appears to us to be an additional opportunity for constructive action. This stems from unexpected progress at the United Nations several weeks after our petition was circulated. On December 5, 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution inviting all States to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva in June 1925, and calling upon all States to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol. We are particularly pleased that the United States supported this resolution in the United Nations.

The United States was the prime initiator of the Geneva Protocol in 1925. Since then, although we have not yet acceded to the Protocol, almost every other nation of the world has done so. We recommend to your favorable consideration that the United States now accede to the Geneva Protocol and thereby firmly establish its stand on these matters.

It is our hope, Mr. President, that the various United States policies and programs referred to in our petition and in this letter will be subjected to a far-sighted examination, aimed at insuring that progress in biological and medical science retains its traditional dedication to the peaceful development of mankind.

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We, the American scientists whose names appear below, wish to warn against any weakening of the world-wide prohibitions and restraints on the use of chemical and biological (CB) weapons.

CB weapons have the potential of inflicting, especially on civilians, enormous devastation and death which may be unpredictable in scope and intensity; they could become far cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons, thereby placing great mass destructive power within reach of nations not now possessing it; they lend themselves to use by leadership that may be desperate, irresponsible, or unscrupulous. The barriers to the use of these weapons must not be allowed to break down.

During the Second World War, the United States maintained a firm and clearly stated policy of not initiating the use of CB weapons. However, in the last few years the U.S. position has become less clear. Since the late 1950's, Defense Department expenditures on CB weapons have risen several fold — and there has been no categorical reaffirmation of the World War II policy.

Most recently, U.S. forces have begun the large-scale use of anti-crop and "non-lethal" anti-personnel chemical weapons in Vietnam. We believe that this sets a dangerous precedent, with long term hazards far outweighing any probable short term military advantage. The employment of any one CB weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others. No lasting distinction seems feasible between incapacitating and lethal weapons or between chemical and biological warfare. The great variety of possible agents forms a continuous spectrum from the temporarily incapacitating to the highly lethal. If the restraints on the use of one kind of CB weapon are broken down, the use of others will be encouraged.

Therefore, Mr. President, we urge that you

- Institute a White House study of overall government policy regarding CB weapons and the possibility of arms control measures, with a view to maintaining and reinforcing the world-wide restraints against CB warfare.
- Order an end to the employment of anti-personnel and anti-crop chemical weapons in Vietnam.
- Reestablish and categorically declare the intention of the United States to refrain from initiating the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Nobel Prize Laureates Who Have Signed the Petition

John Bardeen	Urbana, Illinois	Physics
Felix Bloch	Stanford, California	Physics
Konrad E. Bloch	Cambridge, Massachusetts	Biochemistry
Owen Chamberlain	Berkeley, California	Physics
Carl F. Cori	Boston, Massachusetts	Biochemistry
Donald A. Glaser	Berkeley, California	Physics
R. Hofstadter	Stanford, California	Physics
Arthur Kornberg	Palo Alto, California	Biochemistry
Fritz Lipmann	New York, New York	Biochemistry
Maria Goeppert Mayer	San Diego, California	Physics
Severo Ochoa	New York, New York	Biochemistry
Linus Pauling	Santa Barbara, California	Chemistry
E. M. Purcell	Cambridge, Massachusetts	Physics
Dickinson W. Richards	New York, New York	Medicine
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi	Woods Hole, Massachusetts	Biochemistry
E. L. Tatum	New York, New York	Genetics
Harold C. Urey	San Diego, California	Chemistry

HOLD UNTIL AFTER NEWS CONFERENCE 2:00 PM Tuesday, February 14,
1967. Cabinet Room, Hotel Willard, Pennsylvania Ave. and Fourteenth St.,
Washington, D.C.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925

The text of the substantive part of the protocol reads as follows:

"Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and,

"Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and,

"To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;

"Declare:

"That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration."

The United States delegation at Geneva proposed the ban on gas, and the Polish delegation suggested that this be extended to include bacteriological weapons. The protocol is in force with respect to most countries, including the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Peoples Republic of China, and the U.S.S.R. The United States and Japan signed but did not ratify the protocol. Although the protocol was favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations, the United States Senate in 1926 referred the report back to committee without giving its advice and consent to ratification.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The General Assembly,

Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,

Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,

Affirming that the strict observance of the rules of international law on the conduct of warfare is in the interest of maintaining these standards of civilization,

Recalling that the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925 has been signed and adopted and is recognized by many States,

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference,

1. Calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives;

2. Invites all states to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

148th plenary meeting,
5 December 1966.

170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 14, 1967, 3:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Warfare, Chemical and Biological, Box 51. Secret. A copy was sent to Rostow.

SUBJECT
Scientists' Petition on Chemical and Biological Weapons

This morning (11:00 a.m.) Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA, and I received on your behalf the attached petition and transmittal letter, /2/ opposing any actions weakening the present prohibitions and restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons and specifically criticizing the U.S. for the use in Vietnam of "non-lethal" anti-personnel chemical weapons and anti-crop herbicides.

/2/Neither the petition nor the transmittal letter has been found, but the petition is extensively summarized in *The New York Times*, February 15, 1967, pp. 1, 16.

The petition has been signed by over 5,000 scientists and physicians, including 127 members of the National Academy of Sciences. I was informed that the group would discuss the petition with the press at 2:00 p.m. today. /3/

/3/The scientists' press conference was reported *ibid*.

Specifically, the petition urges you to:

- Institute a White House study of government policy regarding CB weapons.
- Order an end to the employment of anti-personnel and anti-crop chemical weapons in Vietnam.
- Declare the intention of the United States to refrain from initiating the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The covering letter commends the United States for its recent support of the UN General Assembly Resolution calling on all States to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol /4/ and recommends that the United States should now accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 154.

Mr. Fisher and I had a very good discussion with the scientists who delivered the petition. The group has clearly given this problem a great deal of responsible thought. They are seriously concerned about the broader implications of the problem, and this is not simply a disguised criticism of the Administration's policy in Vietnam.

In our initial reaction, I recommend that we simply state we are studying the petition and that I acknowledge the letter on your behalf along these same lines.

As a follow up, I would recommend that at an early press conference in response to a question on the petition, you make a statement clearly stating that we have a "no first use" policy with regard to chemical and biological warfare, with the exception of riot gases and herbicides. Although this would not directly respond to all the points in the petition or transmittal letter, it would deal directly with the most important general question. As you recall, I suggested such a statement in a memo to you (copy attached) /5/ setting forth the concern of your Science Advisory Committee on the general problem of biological warfare. Although Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach both agreed with the proposed statement; McNamara preferred not to push the matter at that time in the face of JCS objections unless there were a clear and urgent reason for doing so. If you are interested, I believe it would be possible to clear such a statement within the government, particularly if the statement were a low-key reiteration and clarification of the position we have already taken in supporting the UN resolution.

/5/Document 154.

Donald Hornig

1. Hornig to acknowledge petition, stating the matter under study.
2. Hornig to clear statement on "no first use" of chemical and biological weapons with McNamara and Katzenbach. /6/

/6/Neither of these options was approved or disapproved or marked to "Discuss."

577
3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Policy on Chemical and Biological
Weapons

We have reviewed Don Hornig's Memorandum For The President of February 14, 1967, in which he recommends that the President make a statement that we have a "no first use" policy with regard to chemical and biological warfare, with the exception of riot gases and herbicides.

While I agree that a statement along the lines proposed by Don would be appropriate, I would like to have the opportunity to review the exact statement proposed for use by the President before it is finally approved.

I perceive only one obstacle to clearing a statement within the government. This is the Department of Defense view that we should keep open the option for first use of incapacitating weapons until we have better information concerning incapacitating agents, their military effectiveness, and the political consequences of their use. In the absence of a convincing case that retaining this option is vital to the national security, I doubt that the potential advantages outweigh the probable political and public opinion costs, domestic and foreign.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-115

By isa, NARS, Date 11-1-83

Richard L. Vothel
Acting Secretary

~~SECRET~~

COPY
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

33

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

G. F. L.
ND 20-1
Retiree taken

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Scientists' Petition on Chemical and Biological Weapons

Last week Don Hornig made two recommendations to you for handling the scientists' petition on chemical and biological weapons:

1. Hornig asked you to authorize him to acknowledge the petition on your behalf, stating that the matter is under study.

I recommend you ask him to do this in an attempt to avoid attracting renewed public attention to the petition.

Tell Hornig he can acknowledge

Draft acknowledgment for me to sign

2. Hornig and the scientists want you to announce publicly that we will use chemical and biological weapons only in retaliation, after others use them against us.

Nick Katzenbach thinks a "no first use" policy which does not cover riot gases and weed killers should be issued. (See attached memo Tab A)

Secretary McNamara agrees with the policy but does not want to issue any statement now because the JCS opposes.

The Chiefs want to keep open the possibility of first use until we have better information about the military effectiveness of incapacitating agents.

I recommend that you ask Walt Rostow to get to you a draft statement on the use of chemical and biological weapons along with the recommendations of the agencies concerned -- State, Defense, JCS, ACDA and USIA -- as to whether it should be made public.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

Rostow to get coordinated statement

Tell Hornig to go ahead

Ask Rostow to talk to me

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83 114
By is, NARS, Date 10-12-83

~~SECRET~~

COPY
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Dr. Bell

6/13

77A

Paul Doty telephoned from the USA on 15/5 May to say that Fulbright's Committee has ~~be~~ had hearings on B & CW. Investigation of this subject was motivated by concern that if Land's view on the slippage of American deterrent power is true, then perhaps the US should see what could be done with B & CW weapons.

CK

Doty's colleague Maselson (whom you will remember from correspondence with Sir Henry Hardman a few years ago) has contributed greatly to the debate - so much so that he has turned the tide in the exactly opposite direction and the Senate may now take positive action for the first time in years on the Geneva protocol.

Maselson will be in Geneva on 24th May and will pass through London on 26th or 27th May. He will telephone you at home in Norfolk.

God

Doty himself may pass through London en route to Paris on 28th May. He'd much hoped to see you when you are in New York, but he himself will be out of the USA for some days during your first week there.

God

60

15/5/69

Handwritten by Iris Hunger

British National Archive

CAB 168/128

The letter was sent
from the British
Embassy in Washing-

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G. Owen,

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From the British National Archive
CAB 168/128

(handwritten on copy of letter) The letter was sent from the British Embassy in Washington, as far as I can deduce from documents filed with this one.

Sir Solly

Paul Doty telephoned from the USA on 15th May to say that Fullbright's Committee has had hearings on B&CW. Investigation of this subject was motivated by concern that if Laird's view on the slippage of American deterrent power is true, then perhaps the US should see what could be done with B&CW weapons.

Doty's colleague Meselson (whom you will remember from correspondence with Sir Henry Hardman a few years ago) has contributed greatly to the debate – so much so that he has turned the tide in the exactly opposite direction and the Senate may now take positive action for the first time in years on the Geneva Protocol.

Meselson will be in Geneva on 24th May and will pass through London on 26th or 27th May. He will telephone you at home in Norfolk.

Doty himself may pass through London en route to Paris on 29th May. He much hopes to see you when you are in New York, but he himself will be out of the USA for some days during your first week there.

15/5/69

Walker
~~Wright~~ John
October 10, 2014

I THINK THIS IS A
CABINET OFFICE
ORIGIN DOCUMENT

— '.... Doty telephoned
from the USA on....

SINCE IT IS MANUSCRIPT,
IT COULD WELL BE
FROM HIS PRIVATE
SECRETARY IN THE
CABINET OFFICE.

John



Record Copying Department
Telephone +44 (0)20 8876 3444 EXT 2389
The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk

Folio 77A, Correspondence Chief Scientific Adviser, Solly Zuckerman dated 15 May 1969

Reference:	CAB 168/128
Description:	Study of chemical and biological warfare by UN group of experts
Date:	1968-1970
Held by:	The National Archives, Kew
Former reference in its original department	Z 60/3
Legal status:	Public Record
Record opening date:	01 January 2001

CHEMICAL LABORATORIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

MEMORANDUM

To: Matt DATE: Dec 16
FROM: Paul 308-
SUBJECT: _____

I slipped in not getting to the Academy summary in time. I don't see any thing in serious need of change in my part. If you do in yours call Mrs. Oleson directly and give her my apologies and compliments.

Please read the Hurdler stuff ~~at~~ and tell me what you think. Let Grace know when she can pick it up.

Paul

Call back.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Office of the Foreign Secretary


November 24, 1969

Dr. Paul Doty
Department of Chemistry
Harvard University
12 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Paul,

After reading the attached, would you give me a call about it? I am trying to get some thoughts together for Dr. Handler.


Cordially yours,


W. Murray Todd
Executive Secretary

Enclosure



BAKTERIOLOGISKA
INSTITUTIONEN



NOV 2 1969
KAROLINSKA INSTITUTET
STOCKHOLM 60
November 5, 1969

Dr. Philip Handler
President, National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington D.C. 20418

USA

Dear Dr. Handler,

At a dinner party on October 31st I had a long talk with Academician Keldys and followed it up by giving him a letter along the same lines as the one I gave you on the way to the airport. I enclose a copy which I hope you will treat with discretion. He listened very carefully and said that the points raised were very interesting indeed. I also got the impression that my suggestion that it might be useful to have an ad hoc Academy Committee consider possible areas for international cooperation in microbiology was well received. If one takes this fact together with the outcome of the Pugwash meeting in Sochi, where the russians came across officially with a positive attitude towards research into control- and inspection I think that there is some reason for optimism.

At the World Peace Congress organized by the World Peace Council in East Berlin (June 69) the following sentence was included in the summary report: "The Commission urges research into the problems of detection violations of the Geneva Protocol and of inspection techniques for non-production of B-weapons". The report from the recent Pugwash Conference in Sochi reads:

"The group then considered the two CBW-disarmamentrelated topics that SIPRI had undertaken on the recommendation of Pugwash. A progress report was heard on the BW inspection experiment. It was felt that this experiment had yielded fruitful results both as regards the technical problems of verifying observance of non-production agreements, and as regards arousing the interest and active participation of several countries, both East and West. The group recommended that Pugwash/SIPRI convene an international symposium to consider how the experiment might most usefully be extended (a) to include an evasion exercise, and (b) to explore the problems of verifying observance of agreements outlawing chemical weapons."


Even if there are obviously signs of some flexibility, the fundamental question is now if this flexibility is big enough to permit a sequential approach to B and C. I personally wonder if the russians fully appreciate how difficult the C-issue must be for the US as long as the Vietnam conflict remains unsolved. If they realized this and think that the comprehensive treaty approach is conducive to a conservation of the difficulties the progress towards a B-freeze will obviously be slow. Opposing a unilateral move towards international cooperation would on the other hand easily offset any political gains from such a policy so they would certainly have to be very careful.

As I mentioned when we met I will obviously have the ear of Mrs. Indra Gandhi and some of her cabinet colleagues in December, when I speak at the opening of the Conference on Global Impacts of Applied Microbiology in Bombay. Hoping that the active concern of a big developing country for the "constructive diversion" approach can then be stimulated, I will focus my talk on this matter. You will receive a copy of the address as soon as it is ready.

With reference to our chat about the science education of parliamentarians I enclose some notes on RIFO, where I was a vice-president for many years.

It was a great pleasure and privilege to meet you in Stockholm, but I hope that I will see you in Sweden during the summer months some other time.

Sincerely yours,



Carl-Göran Hedén

Oct. 31, 1969

Prof. M.V. Keldys
President, USSR Academy of Sciences
Leninsky Prospekt 14
MOSKVA 71

USSR

Dear Academician Keldys,

I am glad that meeting with you on the occasion of the Academy Celebration gave me an opportunity to discuss the CBW-problems with you. They have been in the focus of my attention for many years both as the Vice-president of the Int. Association of Microbiological Societies, as chairman of UNESCO's Microbiology Panel and within the framework of the Pugwash Movement. Particularly during the last year, when I have had a sabbatical in order to coordinate a CBW-study for the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm (SIPRI) I have become convinced that the CBW-issue should be considered as an element of human ecology and global security rather than as a pure problem of disarmament. What I mean is that active rechannelling toward Man's major problems should be emphasized at the expense of the passive abolition of efforts which have involved so much specialized training and so large investments.

Such an approach offers unique possibilities for achieving a constructive impact on the developing countries which - in a sense - hold the issue of future wars in their hands. In this connection a switch of the personnel and equipment available within the various establishments for military microbiology might have a profound effect in many "diversion areas": biological control of insects and pests, development of vaccines etc. The current concern about environmental pollution, the focus on single cell protein research and the growth of enzyme technology add further arguments for a rapid coordinated effort. If this could be made internationally (for instance within the framework of an "International Organization for Applied Microbiology and Public Health") badly needed aid could be provided but also a platform would be available for building the confidence needed to guard against the later emergence of a significant BW-capability somewhere on the globe. The operation of such an international organization would need to be discussed both on the intergovernmental and on the non-governmental level, a suitable occasion for the latter being the International Congress for Microbiology in Mexico City next year in August (cf. enclosed plan). However some preliminary guidance from a few of the big countries before that occasion would be desirable so that the desired functions can be spelled out. Should for instance a hypothetical organization of the type mentioned not only function as a goal-oriented research body but also as a pool for BW-defense competence plus equipment? If the answer is yes one would have to consider if only such countries which signed a disarmament treaty would be granted membership etc. Being confident that we are now on the brink of a critically important disarmament development - the US being very nearly ripe to give up its entire BW-effort - I now feel that the preparation of a constructive response on the part of the USSR is urgently needed.

When I saw Academicians Timokov, Imshenetsky and Millionshikow in Moscow last autumn I mentioned this perspective stressing the need to consider how one might combine verification with the development of mutual confidence and trust. What then seemed like a possible change is now a very likely alteration in the disarmament climate which might well spread from B to C and on through the weapons alphabet, provided of course that a continuing sequence of moves can be maintained. It is quite likely that "diversion towards common goals" may be the key to this problems which brings me to a crucial question. Would you be prepared to support a joint research and development effort in a few selected areas like:

- biological control of insects and pests
- aerosol vaccination
- improvement of veterinary vaccines
- automated identification of pathogens
- large-scale tissue culture for vaccine production?

The best way to begin ought to be to seek to reach an arrangement whereby soviet scientists could join a multinational group of microbiologists working at Fort Detrick at the same time as American scientists joined with an international team at the Gamaleja Institute, the Saratov Institute etc. As you probably know my own Institute is already involved in a related exercise initiated by SIPRI: Dr. A. Sinyak from Moscow working on rapid identification of viruses at the same time as Dr. A. Ujunggren from Stockholm is working in Prague on fluorescent antibody techniques.

It seems to me that the USSR now has a unique possibility to make a creative and certainly popular move. I have so many friends both in the USSR and the USA that I can be a relatively good judge when I say that most microbiologists would welcome leadership with regard to an attack on Man's major problems. They are largely biological, even if for instance the building of agroindustrial complexes etc, of course all require a comprehensive planning where biology is only a part. The enclosures were selected to illustrate the place of microbiology in this context. Perhaps the establishments for military microbiology would not be the optimal location for working on some of the projects mentioned in the papers, but the symbolic value of International efforts based on the facilities available would be enormous. Also I am convinced that an emphasis on the social responsibility of scientists as well as the use of this opportunity to test the "constructive diversion" approach to disarmament would have considerable impact on that disturbingly large segment of the general public which is now basically disenchanting with science.

Sincerely yours,

Carl-Göran Hedén

Extract

At its meeting at UNESCO in Paris on June 5-6th, 1969 the Executive Committee of the International Association of Microbiological Societies (IAMS) the organizers of the Xth International Congress for Microbiology were present during one of the sessions:

"The Executive Committee and the Mexican organizers considered the BW-conference planned for the Congress in the light of Prof. Hedén's consultations as well as the recommendations made by the BW Study Group of the Pugwash Movement (Mariánské Lázně, May 22nd - 23rd, 1969). Prof. Hedén was asked to organize the activities along the lines indicated by the Appendix and to invite the Panel members who should introduce the subject at an open Colloquium under the chairmanship of Prof. A. Lwoff. Drs. Housewright, Zhdanov, Gordon-Smith, Franék and Hedén were named in this connection".

Appendix:

Plan for deescalation discussion in connection with the Xth International Congress for Microbiology (Mexico City, August 9-15, 1970).

1. During the summer of 1969 the member societies are asked by the Secretary General to appoint 1-2 delegates for the BW-talks in Mexico.
2. During the end of 1969 those members receive copies of the SIPRI BCW-review and of the UN Expert Group report. The former is a major (probably 500 pages) cooperative study now being performed at the Stockholm International Peace and Conflict Research Institute (SIPRI) and coordinated by IAMS' Vice-President, Professor C-G Hedén. The second is a report from a group of BCW experts appointed by U. Thant also background material from the Specialized Agencies (in particular WHO), SIPRI and the Pugwash Movement.
3. The two reports mentioned will be supplementary and should be studied by the national delegates mentioned who should, if possible, review ecological consequences etc. at some meeting of their microbiological society during the spring of 1970.
4. The Continuing Committee of the Pugwash Movement approaches ICSU with a report on the plans for BW-discussions in Mexico City and proposes that other professional groups (biochemists, pure- and applied chemists, physiologists, pharmacologists etc.) ought to consider similar moves. The matter is taken up at the ICSU Executive Committee meeting in Eravan (October 2nd and 3rd, 1969).
5. IAMS invites the Panel members mentioned under 6 to a round table discussion in Paris on December 1st in order to coordinate their presentations.

6. An open Colloquium on "BW Deescalation Perspectives" takes place between 10 AM and 7 PM on August 7th, 1969. Participants: a small group of experts (about 5) who make up a panel that will introduce the subject, the national BW-delegates, the Advisory Council (ACIAMS) and Executive Committee (ECIAMS) of the International Association plus interested microbiologists, making up a total of less than 200 people. First the Panel members will give brief talks (20-30 minutes). Then there will be a 10 minute intermission during which the chairman of the Panel (Prof. A. Lwoff) will receive written questions from the floor. He will arrange them in a suitable order and present them to those panel members he sees fit.
7. Between 3-6 PM on August 7th (and 7-10 PM if necessary) the national BW-delegates meet to discuss conceivable initiatives together with ECIAMS and ACIAMS. This would be a closed session with a maximum participation of 100.
8. It is expected that the section of the SIPRI-report which concerns the political future of CBW will list conceivable activities on the part of non-governmental bodies. Such activities might include:
 - A. Activities aimed at strengthening the sense of social responsibility among microbiologists.
 1. A "World Day of Concern" when normal education would be replaced by seminars on global issues (this, of course presupposing that a general ICSU policy can emerge).
 2. International guide-lines with regard to secrecy and contract research at university laboratories.
 3. A "Code of Conduct" for the individual microbiologists.
 4. Chapters for Social Responsibility of Microbiologists within the National Societies. Perhaps international memberships through ICSU could tie such groups together with other professional groups and with national associations for social responsibility of scientists.
 - B. Activities aimed at direct involvement of microbiological societies in BW research deescalation.
 1. Special committees charged with performing a civil review of national defense programmes.
 2. National control- and inspection programmes.
 3. Direct lobbying (governments, scientific advisors, UN, WHO, UNESCO and FAO delegations) as well as indirect pressure (symposia, teach-ins, mass-media etc.)
 - C. Activities aimed at international BW research deescalation.
 1. Voluntary control- and inspection programmes (bilateral, regional and global).
 2. Supranational advisory groups for referral when "free" scientists feel that they are progressing into a sensitive, potentially military field.
9. A drafting committee appointed by the meeting mentioned under 7 reports to a second closed session meeting on Wednesday, August 12th, 1969 between 9 AM and 1 PM. A recommendation to the Second General Assembly is formulated.
10. At the Second General Assembly, (which takes place on Friday, August

14th, 1969, between 4-6 PM) a brief report (15 min.) on the UN report is given by a suitable expert preferably the Mexican delegate on the UN committee: Dr. Soberon who should be invited to the function by the Mexican organizers. This is followed by voting on the recommendations proposed by the "BW Deescalation Perspectives" meetings.

11. A report on the actions taken is given to the Pugwash Plenary meeting which meets on the U.S. East coast after the Mexico Congress.

MEMORANDUM

BIOLOGY

To Paul Doty

From Matthew Meselson

Date December 29, 1970

Subject Dr. Robert P. Mikulak

Here is a candidate for the ACDA position. I wrote to Mikulak several days ago and here is his response. George Rathjens and Jean Scolnocoff both have a good opinion of him. He has a Ph.D. in Chemistry and at one point helped me a little with DBW literature research. My impression is that he is serious, intelligent, and responsible.

20 April 1971

Professor Paul Doty
Conant Laboratory 308
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Paul,

I am applying for a grant to enable me to write an extensive report on our study of the effects of the use of herbicides in Vietnam. The Ford Foundation requires two letters of recommendation in support of the grant application. Would you be willing to supply such a letter?

Only two points need be made in the letter: first, that the proposal is worthwhile and second, that I am capable, in your opinion, of carrying it out. I enclose a copy of the proposal, as well as an envelope addressed to Mr. Gordon Harrison at the Ford Foundation, to whom your letter should be sent.

Thanks for taking the trouble.

Matthew Meselson

MM:em

Enclosures (2)

3 August 1971

MEMORANDUM

To: Paul Doty

From: Matthew Meselson

Subject: Present status of the Geneva Protocol

As you know, the President submitted the Protocol to the Senate last August and the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in March and April. However, the ball is now back in the Administration court due to the fact that a substantial number of Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as others not on the Committee, do not want to see the Protocol ratified with the Administration's current understandings regarding riot control agents and herbicides. On April 15th Senator Fulbright wrote to the President on behalf of the Committee, asking that he "give further consideration to the tear gas and herbicide question." (See enclosure A.)

At the end of last month Senator Brooke and Senator Humphrey filed separate resolutions dealing with the Protocol. Brooke's resolution asks the President to send the dispute to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. It goes on to request that the President seek a specific treaty for prohibiting riot gas and herbicides in case the World Court should find that they are not already prohibited. (See enclosure B.) The Humphrey resolution is simpler and avoids sending dirty laundry to the Hague. It would put the Senate on record as supporting a broad interpretation of the Protocol, one that would cover both riot gas and herbicides. (See enclosure C.) Senator Humphrey has become a co-sponsor of the Brooke resolution, apparently as a gesture of non-partisanship.

Turning now to the situation in the executive branch, the NSC is working on two National Security Information Memoranda, one on herbicides, the other on riot gas. All aspects, ranging from military utility to arms control considerations, are under study. I wouldn't expect these NISM's to contain anything fundamentally new. More likely, their real significance will be to make possible a fresh discussion on a subject that seemed closed a year ago. These new studies, together with this year's developments in the Senate, have reopened the riot gas and herbicide question, extending the President's range of choices.

If I had to identify the two most important arguments on each side of the issue, I would choose the following:

In favor of keeping the present interpretation

1. The Administrations of President Johnson and President Nixon have stated that the Protocol does not prohibit riot gas and herbicides, Giving up this position would undermine U.S. authority and leave the nasty implication that our military forces have been doing something illegal, even though we are not formal parties to the Protocol as

yet.

2. Riot gas and herbicides are useful weapons to have in certain situations that we might get into in future conflicts.

In favor of changing the present position

1. The Senate will not approve the Protocol with the present position on riot gas and herbicides. If the President were to give his solid support to a broadened U.S. interpretation of the Protocol, the treaty would gain Senate approval, even though a few extreme conservatives might be thrown into opposition.

2. The overriding security interest of the United States is to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to other nations and to maintain the strongest possible "gas and bug brake." Perpetuating international disagreement about the meaning of the Geneva Protocol and indulging in any kind of chemical warfare have the opposite effect. A first use option for riot gas and herbicides is of extremely small military utility for us. President Nixon's initiatives of the last two years have gone a long way toward placing us in the leading international role in the control of chemical and biological weapons. However, the President's policies cannot be culminated or made lastingly effective unless the tear gas and herbicide problem is removed and the Protocol is ratified.

On the purely legal side, the experts, both in the government and outside, generally believe that a legal case can be made for either side, but that the case against riot gas and herbicides is the stronger. They believe that our current position would very probably lose before the International Court.

The best way to solve the problem is for the Administration to take the initiative, rather than wait for the Senate to quarrel. One approach would be for the President to say that he has given a great deal of his time to considering the control of chemical and biological weapons. He has done this not so much because these weapons pose an immediate threat, but rather because attention to the problem now can avert a terrible threat to all mankind in the future. His considerations have led him to the view that the defense of our nation does not require such weapons. Indeed, their very uncontrollability makes them unsuitable to our defensive purposes and commitments. However, in the hands of others, chemical and biological weapons could do us and mankind great harm. Beyond these important considerations, he could say, he has become increasingly convinced that the great discoveries of biology and medicine must not be diverted to military purposes. All mankind should be able to agree not to use our expanding knowledge of the life processes for hostile purposes. The President could then recount the far-reaching steps he has already taken, ending up with his submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate.

After explaining the Protocol and ~~the~~ case for our ratification, he could bring up the matter of riot gas and herbicides. Although this is a subject of considerable current dispute, it should be presented in a low key and should not be allowed to upstage the more fundamental and general concerns with regard to CBW that have been discussed in the earlier parts of his statement. In this spirit, the President might say that we have always supported the aims and objectives of the Geneva Protocol and that we have in good faith held the view that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot gas and herbicides. However, he could say, there is certainly room for honest disagreement on

this point since the wording and the history of the treaty are unclear. He could then say that he would not want to let legal and historical uncertainties stand in the way of world-wide agreement on the meaning of a treaty aimed at the overridingly important objective of preventing chemical and biological warfare. He could say that, if that is the issue, the security interests of the United States dictate that we broaden our interpretation of the Protocol to include all toxic chemicals whether directed against man, animals or plant life. This we would do, of course, only on a reciprocal basis. Other countries would be expected to observe the same rule and refrain from any use in war of harassing (riot) gas, herbicides, as well as lethal chemicals, toxins, and biological weapons.

3 August 1971

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To Matt

SEP 21, 1971


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1971

Dear Paul:

Many thanks for forwarding a copy of Matt's memorandum on the present situation regarding the Geneva Protocol. The issues he presents will be given careful consideration in our reviews of riot control agents and chemical herbicides.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

Professor Paul Doty
Department of Chemistry
Harvard University
12 Oxford Street
Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138

MAY 25 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1972

1972

Dear Professor Doty:

Unfortunately Henry departed for the Soviet trip prior to having an opportunity to respond to the letter from you and Professor Meselson of May 16. I will be sure he focuses on it as soon as he returns.

Sincerely,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Professor Paul Doty
Department of Chemistry
Harvard University
12 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
THE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES
16 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

1 December 1980

Prof. Paul Doty
C.S.I.A.
Kennedy School
Boylston St.
Cambridge, MA 02138

Dear Paul,

This is the text telexed to Dr. Armand Hammer on October 12th. Subsequently Hammer informed me that it had been given directly to Brezhnev, as I told you.

Have a good trip and a safe return.

Campbell

DEPARTMENT OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
7 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

November 12, 1981

Mr. Joseph Campbell
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20503

Dear Joe,

This is not quite exactly what I gave to
Paul but it is very close.

Sincerely yours,

Matthew Meselson
Professor of Biochemistry

Enclosure

/kp

Doty

February 12, 1990

Professor Paul Doty
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 Kennedy Street, Room P-26
Cambridge, MA 02138

Dear Paul:

At our CISS meeting in Washington, April 5 and 6, I hope some time can be devoted to the Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations. This session of the CD is rate-limited by the lack of instructions to the US Delegation and by inadequate staff support in Washington. Without more domestic US interest in the Convention, the shortcomings in Washington could persist, imperiling the whole multilateral effort in Geneva. Another problem now coming into view is that of avoiding crippling delays in the chemical demilitarization schedule due to inadequate attention to environmentalist concerns.

I would be glad to prepare a memo if I know in advance that this is a subject that we are willing to tackle. Please let me know. I will try to attend both days but may be unable to be there on the 5th.

Sincerely,

Matthew Meselson

cc: Jeffrey Boutwell

Doty

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Professor Paul Doty
Director Emeritus
(617) 495-1401

John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 J.F.K. Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

October 16, 1990

Prof. Matthew Meselson
BMB

Dear Matt:

At the Pugwash Conference in Egham in mid-September Goldanski gave me the enclosed copy of an interesting article from the USSR Literary Gazette. It is their presentation of the Anthrax Affair. It may or may not contain anything new but it ventilates the various interpretations. I hope you will get it translated. Vitali thought that it might provide an opening for you to reopen the case. Any such attempt might be helped by the fact that Yeltsin was the Party Secretary in Smolensk when the outbreak occurred and it may be able to get his attention.

You will recall that Vitali had told me previously that he had tried to interest the head of the KGB in opening the case but was told that the time was not ripe, too much risk of upsetting the delicate balance.

Sincerely,



PS I expect to see Vitali in Moscow Oct. 27-Nov. 2.

Doty

November 19, 1990

Paul,

There is an IDF videotape showing a troop exercise in the Judean desert with troops in full protective gear storming a defended hill position for 2 hours at 35°C (95°F). There were no heat casualties, although the men were glad to remove their masks at the end of the exercise. The suits were of the older thicker foam-based type, like the present US Army suits. US Marines now have a lighter suit, the British Mark IV.

More recent IDF exercises in new type suits and ventilated masks may also be on videotape.

In Bonn, the person to contact is Dr. Yair SHARAN, at the Israeli Embassy. He is former head of the NBC Section of the IDF. I met his successor, the present head, Dr. Ralf Shain, at Edgewood last week.

With proper authorization, Sharan in Bonn can arrange to provide the 1982 videotape and perhaps more recent videotapes, showing exercises with improved equipment, including the new light weight thinner IDF suit based on charcoal mini-spheres (Blucher spheres) instead of foam. A talk with Sharan to get the IDF perspective on troop and air force performance in anti-chemical protective posture should be valuable and relevant to current issues. A briefing from the German chemical defense people would likewise be useful.

Matt

Doty

July 15, 1992

Dr. Paul Doty
4 Kirkland Place
Cambridge, MA 02138

Dear Dr. Doty:

I am writing to seek your review of the enclosed manuscript "Preliminary Report on the Pathology of Fatal Anthrax in the Sverdlovsk Outbreak of 1979", by F.A. Abramova et al., which I wish to submit to the Proceedings of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.

This article represents the first scientific report resulting from a study trip to Ekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) conducted by Dr. Walker, myself and four others last month. A second article will deal with epidemiologic aspects.

Since the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak has been a matter of unusual importance and controversy, we are anxious to exercise the greatest care and rigor in reaching conclusions regarding its nature and, as will be considered in the subsequent article, its epidemiologic aspects and possible source. I would therefore appreciate your most careful review of both the substance and the organization of the present manuscript.

Sincerely,

Matthew Meselson
Professor of Biochemistry
and Molecular Biology

Paul Doty
4 Kirkland Place
Cambridge, MA 02138

Tel. 617 864-6679
FAX: 617 864-3739

May 22, 1994

Mr. John Maddox
Nature

Dear John:

I'm puzzled over your keeping Matt dangling in the wind. He is leaving Wednesday evening for a European trip and would like to submit his paper elsewhere by then if you cannot accept it as he left it with you.

I hear that you do not want to risk its being referred and hence put it in Commentary. I guess that would be possible but only if it were not cut, and I gather that it would have to be. This returns us to its being referred. It has been examined and most favorably commented on by the most knowledgeable people in the field (including our intelligence people who have worked the problem over and over): and I am sure Matt would welcome further substantive reviews.

I can understand that you would not want reports of ordinary investigations of presumptive arms control treaty violations in Nature. But his paper stands so far above that both in the central importance of the issue it addresses and in the quality of the science used that it should not be excluded by such a pedestrian filter. Indeed, I think it will be a classic and that is the view I had from both Graham Pearson and Josh Lederberg with whom I have discussed it.

Anyway, that's how I feel as a bystander. But, do decide if you can accept it as he left it with you, subject to refereeing, or not and let him know. It surely deserves prompt publication and a month has passed since I thought it was settled at his meeting with you in London.

With warmest regards

Paul

Paul Doty
4 Kirkland Place
Cambridge, MA 02138

Tel. 617 864-6679
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With warmest regards

Paul

From Paul Doty to
John Deutch

Confidential

November 7, 1996

Dr. John Deutch
DCI

Dear John:

Before you leave being Director I urge you to put George, or someone of equal weight, in charge of clarifying CIA's role in the mycotoxin case. Porton Down, as well as Swedish and French intelligence, do not believe that mycotoxin was used in Southeast Asia and Meselson convincingly refutes the few positive tests done by the DIA's contractor that became the basis for US claims and policy. In this situation CIA's role needs to be mercilessly scrutinized. If it cannot stand muster, an admission should be made in order to contribute to the Agency's credibility and to correct our own policy claims. Otherwise the dispute will eventually leak. Oehler is working on the case but I fear he will not do the job that is needed.

Sincerely,

From Paul Doty to
John Deutch

Confidential

November 7, 1996

Dr. John Deutch
DCI

Dear John:

Before you leave being Director I urge you to put George, or someone of equal weight, in charge of clarifying CIA's role in the mycotoxin case. Porton Down, as well as Swedish and French intelligence, do not believe that mycotoxin was used in Southeast Asia and Meselson convincingly refutes the few positive tests done by the DIA's contractor that became the basis for US claims and policy. In this situation CIA's role needs to be mercilessly scrutinized. If it cannot stand muster, an admission should be made in order to contribute to the Agency's credibility and to correct our own policy claims. Otherwise the dispute will eventually leak. Oehler is working on the case but I fear he will not do the job that is needed.

Sincerely,

Paul -
Deutch has cancelled
Friday's trip to Cambridge -
Hope you send this
anyway -
M.

Confidential

November 7, 1996

Dr. John Deutch
DCI

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To M. Meselson

Deutch

Confidential

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To M. Meselson

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Confidential

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Sincerely,

Paul

Date: Thu, 14 Nov 1996 13:10:15 -0500 (EST)
From: "Matthew S. Meselson" <msm@wjh.harvard.edu>
To: Paul DOTY <pauldoty@husc4.harvard.edu>
Subject: Re: Reply to yrs of 11 Nov (fwd)

----- Forwarded message -----

Date: Thu, 14 Nov 1996 12:32:30 +0500
From: "Gordon O." <gordon@iron.ucia.gov>
To: msm@wjh.harvard.edu
Subject: Re: Reply to yrs of 11 Nov

Hi,

Yes, I did receive your note dated the 12th. I thought your recap of our conversation was fine.

John Deutch is out of town tomorrow -- back Monday. I'll bring the issue up again then. I'm sure he would rather be looking at yellow rain now, He is going out to Watts to host a town meeting on the charges that CIA caused the crack cocaine epidemic in Calif. Good luck!

Sincerely,

Gordon

Guillemin's book.

Paul Doty
4 Kirkland Place
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617 864-6679 Fax: 617 864-3739
EMail: pauldoty@fas.harvard.edu

June 29, 1999

Ms. Danielle Chatwell
University of California Press
Berkeley, CA

Dear Ms. Chatwell:

The cover item for the Guillemin book is given below. Feel free to modify it if the meaning is preserved.

Sincerely yours,

Paul Doty

Guillemin's book is a triple treat: it is a gripping detective story, a vivid portrayal of non-Moscow Russian life, and a standard-setting display of the scientific method at work. And there is a bonus: the reader will learn all about anthrax, the most likely weapon if biological warfare is ever waged.

*Jeanne: It is a great book. Let's
hope it is appreciate.*

Paul

Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 09:24:38 -0400
From: Je n Hernandez <jahern@us.ibm.com>
To: msm@wjh.harvard.edu
Cc: pauldoty@fas.harvard.edu
Subject: Origins of US Executive Orders banning BW and toxins.

Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218
(914) 945-2555
FAX: (914) 945-4419
INTERNET: RLG2 at watson.ibm.com

May 26, 2004

(Via Email to msm at wjh.harvard.edu)

Dr. Matthew S. Meselson
Fairchild Biochemistry Building
Harvard University
7 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138

Dear Matt,

It was good to talk with you at the dinner Saturday night at John's Energy and Security Symposium.

I am glad you are looking into the origin of the U.S. Executive Orders banning biological weapons and toxins, and I hope that you will follow up by talking with Paul Doty about this.

As I mentioned, I served on the PSAC Panel created to advise President Nixon in advance of this Executive Order. We were furnished with two "minders," who, as I recall, were Barry Carter and Walt Slocombe. They were a lot younger then.

In any case, here is the response I received from Henry in 1972, when I suggested that President Nixon use his achievement in the reelection campaign. I provide also the letter I sent him.

Since Paul chaired this Panel, I am sure he could tell you a lot more about it.

Very best regards.

Sincerely yours,

/R.L. Garwin/

Richard L. Garwin
Forwarded in his absence

Encl:

01/29/72 LTR H.A. Kissinger to RLG. (012972.HAK)
01/11/72 LTR RLG to H.A. Kissinger. (011172.HAK)

cc:

P. Doty, Harvard. (Via Email to pauldoty at fas.harvard.edu)

RLG:jah:4147MSM:052604.MSM

(See attached file: FAX206984363311_9149453000.TIF)
(See attached file: FAX206984363311_9149453000.TIF)
[Part 2, Application/OCTET-STREAM (Name:]

Richard L. Garwin

Post Office Box 218, Yorktown Heights, New York 10598

(914) 945-2555

January 11, 1972

Dr. Henry Fissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

Among the President's accomplishments which cannot possibly be placed on the scale between disappointment and disaster are his 1969 actions in unilaterally renouncing for the United States not only the use but also the development and manufacture of biological warfare agents and toxins. This is a good solid achievement, and one which I hope will be used in any credible accounting of the accomplishments of the administration.

I have just sent Senator Fulbright a letter and a paper which could provide a basis for compromise between the positions "no gas" and a general interpretation of the Geneva Protocol as banning riot control agents. I don't have much hope for its success.

I have read with interest the documents recently released by Jack Anderson. I see no reason why the person transmitting this information to him cannot be detected, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. For the future, an overt marking scheme for Secret documents should be considered, whereby a large transparent numeral might be overlaid on the text, as I have illustrated on this page. A covert marking scheme might also be employed which could use subtle distortions of the letterhead or other means. In this way, one would at least know which authorized copy was the source of a bootlegged copy later made available for analysis.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
January 11, 1972
Page 2

A few months before the Ellsberg affair, Hal Lewis and I discussed with Bob Froehke and his minions the need for a complete revision of the means of creating, protecting, and transmitting classified information. We were not touching on the policy questions but simply on technological and operational possibilities for doing a better job in support of a policy. It might be desirable for you to task DOD and CIA independently to propose such revisions of our techniques and procedures which might make a major reduction in the probability of loss or compromise of classified information. At some later time, a choice could be made among the proposals, and a combined implementation program begun. It seems that this could all be done through the National Security Memorandum mechanism.

I keep looking for a rabbit to be pulled out of the SALT hat, and certainly hope that when the time comes we will see more than just the evidence that a rabbit was once there.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Dark Brown

enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE**WASHINGTON****R L GARWIN
IBM WATSON LABORATORY****January 29, 1972**

JAN 30 9 AM 10:50

Dear Dick:

Your compliment on the President's action in banning the development and manufacture of biological warfare agents is most welcome. We have pointed to that accomplishment in the President's annual report to the Congress on foreign policy and I am sure it will be noted prominently in the course of the year.

I have sent your suggestion on a marking scheme for classified documents to an interagency committee which is looking into ways to foreclose the kind of leaks you mentioned. I am sure they will find it helpful.

Warm regards,
Henry A. Kissinger

**Mr. Richard L. Garwin
Post Office Box 218
Yorktown Heights, New York 10598**