

HAK  
Tuesday June 23, 2015  
Made from my agenda and from  
notes written after leaving Henry's office

Appointment was for 11:30.  
350 Park Avenue, 26<sup>th</sup> floor  
I arrived at 11:15

Katherine Matthews, Henry's new appointment secretary, greeted me and gave me coffee in the waiting room. Henry came in from his office across the hall at about 11:20 and we went into the office. I sat on the sofa, Henry on an adjacent upholstered chair, the same as last visit.

I said it was good to see him and asked how he was. He said he was well but aware of the actuarial tables. He asked how old I was. I said 85, seven years younger than he.

He said I should come with Jeanne next time. I said she was writing a book on the Tokyo war crimes trials of 1946-47. He made a comment that I do not remember.

I asked about his archive. Personal papers are at Yale, official papers are at State. A small percentage of papers at Yale contain classified material. He said he prefers to wait until the next administration before pressing for a security review of the Yale collection because of concern that the present administration might engage in selective release.

I asked when Niall Ferguson's biography would be published. Henry said it would be out in September and would cover the period up to 1969. [Added later: Kissinger: Volume I: The Idealist, 1923-1968]

I said I have the minutes of the January 12, 1966 session of the Harvard-MIT Arms Control Seminar in which Henry reported on his first trip to Viet Nam -- to consult for Cabot Lodge. He said he did not know there were minutes of the seminars and would like to have them. I said I had minutes of only that one session, in which I participated, and would try to find the minutes of other sessions. [I mailed the January 1966 minutes to him on June 29 and next day telephoned Katherine Matthews asking her to tell Henry I had done so and that I am looking for minutes of other sessions.]

I said his report to the seminar portrayed a divided and ineffective government in Saigon and in the provinces and an effectively organized VC opposition in the countryside. And that Westmorland's strategy was to attempt to locate, engage and destroy VC main forces while Viet Cong operations were based on psychological and political criteria so that, although not seeking to have any territory under their full-time control, they were able to collect taxes nearly everywhere. And that the VC controlled the entire delta even though there were no VC main forces there. Henry said that Westmorland was a nice person but limited by his experience in WWII.

I said I thought Abram's strategy was very different and that I had spent a morning with him in September 1970 at his headquarters, the last day I was in Viet Nam. That he asked me what I thought of the military utility of the herbicides and that I said I had not studied that aspect whereupon Abrams said he thought the herbicide program was "shit" but that he had to get the 55-gallon drums off the decks at Danang and Saigon so as to be able to offload the supplies he needed but that the decision to use them was made in Washington. Henry said that Abrams was a decent man.

I said I remembered a conversation we had on a late afternoon in his Semitic Museum office when he had just returned from his first trip to Viet Nam--that he seemed tired and had said "Matt now I know how the good Germans must have felt." [This is quoted in the 1983 book by Seymour Hersh.] And that this had made a deep impression on me. Henry did not respond -- just remained silent for a few moments. I did not pursue the matter. [Next time we are together I will ask to what he was referring].

I changed the subject, saying it was good that he had come to speak at Harvard this year and the year before. I recalled that after his talk at the Law School I met his son David [a television producer in Los Angeles] and asked how he was. Henry said he was well, living in California and had come with his daughter [a first-year Harvard student??].

I said I was sorry he had not come back after leaving government to teach and interact with students at Harvard--that I was one of a small group that Derek brought together to advise on whether or not to offer a University Professorship. Henry said he had not known how the decision was reached. I said that in addition to Derek, the group consisted of Seymour Martin Lipsett, Konrad Bloch, myself, and one other [maybe Dan Aron]. That the others were opposed and that I disagreed, that I had seen Henry with students and that considering Henry's extraordinary experience in government it would be a loss for Harvard students not to bring him back. Henry said that he would (probably?) not have returned to Harvard and that not returning had left him freer to act.

I said that it was the Cambodian incursion that particularly upset some of his Harvard colleagues who had not spoken out strongly against the war before that. Henry said that we were being heavily attacked from what had been a sanctuary across the border and had to respond.

I had brought with me a copy of part of Henry's doctoral dissertation from which I read aloud a passage that said "*If a society legitimizes itself by a principle which claims both universality and exclusiveness, if its concept of justice does not include the existence of different principles of legitimacy, relations between it and other societies will come to be based on force.*" I asked if he thought this applied to present US-Russia relations. Henry said that Putin was expecting the 2014 Olympic games in Sochi to portray Russia as a major part of the West and that the sudden anti-Russia political change in Kiev, including passage of a law prohibiting the use of Russian as an official language, had come as a shock. That Putin sees the US as seeking regime change. Henry said he had supported the inclusion of Poland in NATO but that Ukraine should not become a member of NATO. I asked what step the USG was specifically asking Putin to take in order to have the sanctions removed. Henry said that the objective of the Whitehouse seemed to be regime change.

On Russia-China relations, Henry said that China aims to create something like the old Silk Road, a trade and economic zone extending from China westward through Asia into Eastern Europe but that China is traditionally unlikely to want to expand its territory into areas populated by people who are not Chinese. That after the China-India war of 1962 the Chinese pulled back from Indian territory and even left the Indian weapons in the field intact. I mentioned that when China invaded Viet Nam in 1979, after advancing pretty far into Viet Nam, China had withdrawn without expanding its borders. [The question of Tibet did not come up.]

I had brought a copy of Henry's 5-page undated memorandum for the President on "U.S. Policy on Toxins" in which Henry recommended Option II but on which someone (Henry? The President?) had handwritten "OPTION III" and on which Nixon had written his initials opposite "Approve". I said that this was done at Key Biscayne in early February 1970 and asked Henry if he remembered what caused Nixon to approve Option III [renunciation of toxins regardless of how they are made] instead of accepting Henry's apparent recommendation of Option II [renunciation of toxins if made biologically but not if made by chemical synthesis] Henry examined the memo and asked if he could keep it,

which he did. [Recall that Doty had told me the day after the decision that Henry had telephoned him asking if he had a copy of my memo "What Policy for Toxins" and that Henry had called again later that night to say they had found the paper and it was the part about maintaining Presidential credibility that had convinced the President to renounce toxins entirely.]

I mentioned Hans Morgenthau and remembered that he had early advocated leaving Vietnam at once while Henry had argued for leaving only after a stable RVN government could be formed. Henry said he had high regard for Morgenthau and had written a memorial of Morgenthau in the New Republic. That there had been a publication (where? by whom?) about some sort of scandal involving Morgenthau's private life. I asked Henry if he had known Solly Zuckerman. He recalled that Zuckerman was UK science advisor but did not know him well—mainly in connection with their mutual opposition to the idea of the multilateral force during the Kennedy Administration.

Henry said he had to leave for an appointment. I left at about 12:20.