

HAN SWYTER

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1462 South Greenmount Drive, Apt 406 Alexandria, Virginia 22311 (703) 820-5245

September 23, 2011

Dr. Matthew Meselson  
Molecular and Cellular Biology  
Harvard University  
16 Divinity Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Matt:

Your note with the list of DPMs arrived while I rushed toward a deadline. I apologize for the delay.

Obtaining the list was a coup. Now we have the formal names of each DPM. No FOI will be needed. In which DPM is the section explaining (recommended) policy on biological offensive capability? What OSD Systems Analysis had to say, writing in the Secretary's shoes, would fit in about half a page. I guess as follows, if this topic was addressed at all, it was addressed in order of likelihood in:

- Tab D theater nuclear, or
- Tab C strategic, or
- Tab A nato, or
- Tab H land forces, or
- Tab F general purpose forces.

John Wilson's note says he saw nothing on "CB weapons" when quickly scanning (did he scan all? just Tab C?) Sanitizing could turn a paragraph or a page into a blank.

Each copy would cost about \$15. I suggest starting with two, D theater nuclear and C strategic. In the meantime, I have already mailed the memo and list to Randy Revelle in Seattle. I hope they will stimulate his memory or his search of the room in his weekend house. Randy was Alain Enthoven's editor, the junior of two. Randy remembers packing the DPMs in a rush to send to the White House in January 1969.


Dr. Matthew Meselson

September 23, 2011

I would like a copy made on your copier if permitted of theater nuc DPM for old times sake. That's the one I worked on a long time ago in autumn 1966, 1967, and I assume 1968. I remember being involved in CB in summer 1968 because an "intern," Jack Wheeler, worked on chemical capability for me then. I took on another task before I left OSD in April 1969 and might not have worked on the theater nuc DPM in autumn 1968. However, I remember well Ivan Selin explaining to me his simple logic about biological offensive capability and my trying to write it concisely. Logically, of course, that paragraph or two could have been inserted in several DPMs. I list above my guess of which DPM if any in order of likelihood.

I'll let you know what turns up from Randy Revelle.

All the best,




Han Swyter

P.S. I'm often away for 3-8 weeks with Annalies. My 703-820-5245 has an answering device. When I'm away, that number rings without end.

Enclosure

\\HsMisWdA\LmMeselson 92311.doc

In that case, you know I'm away. I am in touch with Tai while away. If you leave a message with her 703 845-1126, I'll get the message and call with some days delay.



## Ropper, Sandy

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**From:** John Wilson [john.wilson@nara.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 31, 2011 1:35 PM  
**To:** Ropper, Sandy  
**Subject:** DPMs  
**Attachments:** Document (4).pdf

Dear Ms. Ropper,

Attached is a list (copied from Papers of Alain Enthoven, box 4, Draft Presidential Memos, 1968-1969, tabs A-F) of the last set of DPMs we have, with their declassification status noted by me. While they are all from January 1969, none are from January 20th, and the folder does not contain anything directly from Clifford. From an earlier conversation (perhaps with Ms. Montgomery) I recall it is the DPM on *Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces* that is of interest to you. It is available in sanitized form. As fair warning I think I should tell you the sanitizations are rather extensive, and in a quick scan I did not see any information on chemical or biological weapons. You can order a copy, and request another declassification review if you wish. It was reviewed just a few years ago, so a new review may not release anything new. Photocopies by mail cost \$.30 per page, plus shipping and a \$2.00 handling fee.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30

By: *W. C. ...* NARA, Date: *9-9-04* DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUMS

This document consists of *516* pages.  
Copy No. *1* of *1* copies, Series *A*

- TAB A *SANi*  
DPM on NATO Strategy and Force Structure, dtd. 1/7/68(U). SECRET 22p.
- TAB B *SANi*  
DPM on Asia Strategy and Force Structure, dtd. 1/2/69 (U). SECRET 23p.
- TAB C *SANi*  
DPM on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces, dtd. 1/9/69 (U). TOP SECRET 38p.
- TAB D *SANi*  
DPM on Theater Nuclear Forces, dtd. 1/15/69 (U). TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA. 29p.
- TAB E *SANi*  
DPM on Nuclear Weapons and Materials, dtd. 1/17/69(U). TOP SECRET 30p.
- TAB F *declassified*  
DPM on General Purpose Forces, dtd. 1/15/69 (U). SECRET 12p.
- TAB G *declassified*  
DPM on Logistic Guidance for General Purpose Forces, dtd. 4/10/68 (U). SECRET 12p.
- TAB H *declassified*  
DPM on Land Forces, dtd. 1/11/69 (U). SECRET 17p.
- TAB *declassified*  
Army and Marine Corps Land Forces-Planning and Control Memo., dtd. 1/11/69 (U). SECRET 49p.
- TAB I *SANITIZED*  
DPM on Tactical Air Forces, dtd. 1/13/69 (U). SECRET 37p.
- TAB J *empty*  
DPM on Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces, dtd. 1/15/69 (U). TOP SECRET 33p.
- TAB K *declassified*  
DPM on Escort Ship Forces, dtd. 1/6/69 (U). SECRET 22p.
- TAB L *declassified*  
DBPM on Amphibious Ship Forces, dtd. 1/10/69 (U). SECRET 27p.
- TAB M *declassified*  
DPM on Naval Replenishment and Support Forces, dtd. 1/4/69 (U). SECRET 24p.
- TAB N *declassified*  
DPM on Mobility Forces (U). SECRET 36p.
- TAB O *declassified*  
Secretary of Defense Guidance Memo on Indirect Support Aircraft, dtd. 1/3/69 (U). SECRET 31p.
- TAB P *declassified*  
Secretary of Defense Guidance Memo on Manpower, dtd. 1/17/69 (U). SECRET 27p.
- TAB Q *declassified*  
Secretary of Defense Guidance Memo on Pilots and Navigators, dtd. 1/8/69 (U). SECRET 24p.
- TAB R *declassified*  
Secretary of Defense Guidance Memo on Shipbuilding (U). CONFIDENTIAL 14p.

If enclosures are withdrawn or not attached the classification of this correspondence will be cancelled.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

HAND CONTROL NO. *TS-864*

~~TOP SECRET~~

10

FOR INTERNAL USE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ONLY

Tentative  
Record of Decision

January 15, 1969

RESTRICTED DATA  
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, 1954  
AS AMENDED

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

on

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 04-270

By SAW, NARA, Date 12/7/07

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Page 1 of 29 pages  
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~~TOP SECRET~~


DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

Our continuing review of theater nuclear and related chemical and biological forces leads us to the following major conclusions:

1. We buy theater nuclear forces primarily to deter limited nuclear war. If deterrence should fail, these forces give us options to fight such a war. Our recommended forces are generally appropriate in number and mix for the tasks we have identified.



3.3(b)(5)

7. Pending further study, our present stockpile of lethal and incapacitating biological agents appears to be appropriate in size and mix.

6.2(a)




IV. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FORCES

A. Lethal Chemicals

Lethal chemicals can kill many unprotected troops quickly. Casualties are very low against protected troops, but the combat effectiveness of troops in protective clothing is degraded.

3.3(b)(1/5)




For NATO's Center Region, the approximate additional 10-year costs for equipment and munitions (above our current inventories) to provide a lethal chemical deterrent, which would give us some war-fighting capability, are shown in the next table.

Capability	Additional 10-Year Cost a/ (In \$ Millions)
Defensive Protection for 11 U.S. Division Forces (DFs) and 5 Forward Air Bases	\$ 400
Offensive Capability for the U.S. and Allied Sectors	140
Total Costs	\$ 540

3.3(b)(5)

a/ [Redacted]



3.3(b)(5)


We recommend disapproving the JCS proposal to buy a chemical incapacitating capability for all land and air forces at a 10-year cost of \$440 million (excluding costs for research, development, and operations in Vietnam).

C. Lethal and Incapacitating Biological Weapons

Lethal biological agents are essentially strategic weapons in that they can kill a high percentage of people over a large area. Biological warfare would be hard to limit, there is little defense against it, and detection of the source of the attack might be impossible. If we were willing to publicize a biological capability, we might be able to buy lethal biological weapons

January 15, 1969

rather than nuclear weapons as a deterrent to strategic war. However, since we already have a strategic nuclear Assured Destruction capability, we do not need lethal biological weapons now. Pending further analysis of this issue, we recommend disapproving the JCS proposal to stockpile a lethal biological capability.



3.3 (b)(5)

U.S. STOCKPILE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS a/

FY 68

FY 69

*See RA 80*

~~See memo~~ CHEMICAL AGENTS

Incapacitating

- CS (Tons)
- BZ (Tons)
- PG-2 (Pounds)

Lethal

- HD (Tons)
- VX (Tons)
- GB (Tons)
- XR
- TZ

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Incapacitating

- MN (Gallons)
- FX (Gallons)
- TD (Pounds)

Lethal

- ZZ (Pounds)
- TR-2 (Pounds)

Anti-Crop

- TX (Pounds)
- LX (Pounds)

SPECIAL DEVICES e/

Small Area Coverage Devices

- M4 Disseminators (15 grams)
- M5 Depositor (150 grams)
- M32 Generator (700 grams)

Individual Devices

- M1 Missile (1 Milligram)
- M2 Cartridge (75 Milligrams)

*DDMI*

*Sci Def #*

*JCS*

*ISA mem  
Int Affairs*

*IS. noticed  
CBW 66-67.*

*Visited Dorrak.*

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*3.3(b)(5)*

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*CBW*

*Alan Easton*

*Fred Hoffman*

*Always in*

*Signt Avail*

*Bob Anthony*

*Comptroller*

*Be there 2200 hrs.*

- a/ Excluding herbicides and defoliants.
- b/ Excludes stocks and pipeline for Vietnam.
- c/ Up to several hundred pounds stored in special devices.
- d/ A few grams stored in special devices.
- e/ Shows the numbers of devices in the stockpile. The average quantities of chemical or biological agent (PG-2, XR, TZ, TD, ZZ, or TR-2) per device are shown in parentheses.