

2002

We left Boston on the USAir shuttle to New York at 8 and arrived at around 9:45 in the city. We took a taxi to Lexington and 53rd--near the Brook Club between Lexington and Park, where lunch was set for one o'clock. We went to the club, introduced ourselves to the manager (Gregory?) And then went for breakfast at the Palladium, a cafe a few blocks away. After that we left the two binders of documents MM had prepared at the Brook Club and walked around the area, stopping by the Waldorf.

We went over some questions to ask: what were the president's real considerations about the banning of biological weapons. Were there documents from primary actors? Were HK's personal observations on record. Would he remember the Key Biscayne phone call reported by Paul Doty about toxins? Was there anyone close to the president who influenced him?

We were at Brook Club at 12:50 and, after checking our coats and the binders (not allowed in third floor lunch room), we were shown upstairs. (Matthew used the first floor men's room while the manager and I waited and discussed how the second floor is reserved for men only, except on certain days of the year, and has a communal table; we would have lunch on the third floor). On the third floor we waited in a room to the left of the elevator that had Gilbert Stuart's portrait of John Jay and a Samuel F.B. Morse of some other similar fellow and three other lesser portraits of the same kind. We were served perriers. Two men waited in the hall by the elevator, on the watch. Henry called to say he would be a few minutes late. By around 1:20 we were seated for lunch.

He was shorter than I had imagined, slightly tanned, his face familiar but wrinkled. After lunch, MM and I went back to the Waldorf and I took notes on what we both remembered about the meeting.

Right after we were seated, MM went directly to the question of what HK remembered about the 1969 decision. HK said that he had not looked over his files. The decision was made early in the administration, he said, before Nixon began to tape. ( thought he gave me an embarrassed glance at the mention of the word tape).

About Nixon, HK made the point that Nixon did not have to be persuaded to ban bw. It was an easy issue. MM repeated the "seeds of destruction" quote. HK agreed that this sentiment was central, that nuclear weapons already had the power of mass destruction. He thought that the phrase probably came from his own office, though he said he did not write them himself. Later he mentioned that the process at the time was for his office to write papers that were always judged too academic, so someone in the president's office would distill the ideas, and that HK always had veto power over the ideas. The question of who influenced Nixon seemed to fall flat. Later in the lunch, I told the story of George Bush being influenced by his mother regarding the ban on chemical weapons. Henry had not heard this story. Before I could relate this story to Nixon, MM brought the conversation to the present tense. I suggested that President Bush might be influenced by family members to give more support to the BWC.

Then began a discussion about verification. HK asked about Iraq and about the difficulty of detecting bw. MM responded with his "wrong end of the telescope" argument.

HK asked about the level of bw use and the question of proof. MM introduced the idea of a threshold of bw use but HK and MM agreed that all bw use was meant.

JG added that "natural" versus "unnatural" incidents could be distinguished--as in Sverdlovsk. JG promised to send HK a copy of her book.

HK said we were in a new era. Once if someone did something there was a response. Now nuclear and bw justified a response before use, didn't they?

MM made point that bw is difficult to find, so how can you have a response? MM talked about how US and USSR had vast scale of bw. He clarifies that Iraq had an anthrax slurry, not up to US or USSR standards. Henry is taken with the idea that a small amount of bw can have large repercussions.

HK had no recollection of Key Biscayne phone call. (Aside here that he had recently read Philip Roth saying that growing old was losing your memory. MM tells of teaching and having a short term memory problem with all new scientific facts. JG adds that he also didn't much care about the new facts.)

HK not interested in writing about bw decision except in memoir--no interest in self-achievement piece.

MM about whether the USSR thought US had held on to a standby bw capacity, mentions leaving our stuff in South Pacific in the 1960s--did the Soviets think then that we had standby.

HK says we had no standby capacity.

MM asserts that experts were let go, that they were disgruntled. (Later MM not sure if all experts were let go in 1969-70)

MM asked HK who was the teacher who most influenced him. HK replied that --gandel Elliot--a man who was not especially great, who later became a kind of second-class consultant--had paid HK a lot of attention. He assigned HK an essay on Kant--this after HK had been in the army and returned to college--and then he told HK that he had "a first-rate mind" something that HK said he had not thought of himself.

MM asked about HK working for Rockefeller after Harvard. HK said he limited the amount of money from NR to what his academic salary would have been, that he didn't want to be taken in by the Rockefeller money. HK said that at Harvard he had a Saturday group (not his seminar) that concentrated on mid-range and long-term policy issues. He said that with the Vietnam war protest, academics either were revolutionaries who wanted to change government radically or they were applying for jobs at assistant secretaries and above. In government, short term tactics fill the days. There is little mid and long range planning, which is where academics can be useful. But today academics try to be tactical while knowing not much about government present time activities.

HK remarked that Bush will have to show he is against BW, with the inference that this would

be a move against Iraq, before getting to the treaty issue. MM asked whether the UN could have an ad hoc tribunal for cases of bw use, pre arranged and not subject to veto. HK agreed this could be done.

Henry asked JG about herself, she told of meeting MM at Aspen and then getting involved in yellow rain as person who did interviews via connection from MM for CIA (Stuart S.--whom MM didn't seem to remember as CIA) and then on to Russia. JG said she was raised in Cold War atmosphere and was somewhat afraid to go to USSR in 1988 but eager to go in 1992.

MM told story of getting invitation to Ekaterinburg iva Gubanov.

JG praised opera house in Ekaterinburg, said city was removed from Moscow. HK has never been much beyond Moscow. HK said his musical appreciation stops at R Straus and maybe Stravinsky.

MM asked HK what he did for leisure. Answer: walk, read, swim. HK said when young he thought age was an affliction that would happen to others not him. He said he is 78 but does not think of retiring because he loves what he does, it is not work. MM agrees. JG makes reference to MM's father working until 91. JG refers to Larry Holmes book about MM and relentless work schedule.

JG mentioned she had worked as Congressional Fellow in DC. HK comments that DC is demoralizing when you are not in power--unless you write. Politicians at present do not want substance; they want impact. HK remembered and liked Durrenberger, Senator JG worked for who ran afoul of ethics committee on book selling deal.

JG mentioned power of media in DC. HK recounted that contrary to what some think he did not let information leak--that he held substantive press briefings and that good journalists could find information in them if they looked.

HK on Putin: Putin worked in the analytic part of KGB and cares about world affairs. Last summer (?) HK spent several hours with him. He has a good opinion of Putin.

JG asked about Homeland Security. HK said Ridge seemed good but he had no power, no money and no programs. JG pointed out that he had influence with Bush, that he influenced the increase in the NIH budget. HK replied that you cannot keep pestering the president for money.

On Korea and Iran, HK said Bush will never touch them. But Iraq could be different. MM thought that UNMOVIK might be a solution, that Hans Blick (?) Would know.

MM verifies that HK brought the book Andromeda Strain to Nixon who read it. HK presumed that MM was influential in decision, that he MM must have his set of documents. MM tells HK that there is a binder of information for him downstairs.

HK laughed when he said that he had no plan to visit Harvard.

To JG he commented that teaching in the social sciences must be difficult now, implication of some reduced freedom (don't know if he meant pc issue or patriotism issue). JG emphasized that

MIT atmosphere was open.

MM and HK discuss treaty promotion. MM emphasizes the "voice" or tone that the argument must make.

On elevator down to lobby, guard explained that second floor was just for men and then gave details on once a year ladies dinner, etc. HK seemed not to know any of these rules. In lobby, MM gave him the big three ring binder with documents, which HK handed to an assistant with instructions that it should go to the country this weekend. In it were also the Science article, the NYRB article, and JGs Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society article. Very friendly good by at around 2:50.

JG and MM went back to Waldorf (3-4:15), tried to reach Chris Vlasto at ABC news who had tried to reach us in Boston. We left a few messages for him but did not hear back. We went to the UN at 5 to meet Igor L and others (Harry, Peter) involved with UNMOVIK. Left there at 6:45 to get the 8 pm shuttle to Boston. We helped the UN people get the DRES report off the web. Igor recounted how in 1993 Nikita asked him to arrange our meeting with General Y. Igor said he made sure the general read the draft (in Russian) of the Science paper. Which made the general angry, but Igor encouraged him to have a conversation with the Americans, to explain his views. Igor is in the file photo taken in 1993 in Moscow with General Y.