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May 8, 1964

Dr. Vincent McCrea  
President's Scientific Advisory Committee  
Executive Offices Building  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. McCrea,

During our discussion at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on March 24, you asked me to supply a memo on steps we might take to minimize the chance that U.S. policies or programs in the BCW area might lead to the introduction of these weapons onto the world military scene.

As you know, I think the United States has much more to lose than to gain from the use of CBW weapons. Even though technical distinctions can be made between incapacitating and lethal agents and between chemical and biological ones, I should think these distinctions would become badly blurred in public opinion and also in world military usage when it comes down to actual practice.

I doubt very much that the following list contains anything you have not already considered.

- 1) Doctrine. I believe the most important single step would be an emphatic restatement of the policy declared by President Roosevelt and somewhat less emphatically stated by President Eisenhower. Such an affirmation would certainly not have to appear as a break in policy. For example the President could respond to a question at a press conference in terms as emphatic as those used by Roosevelt in 1943, "I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies".
- 2) Statements in Classified and Unclassified writings. Following the reaffirmation of a strictly defensive doctrine, field manuals, technical manuals and other official publications, whether classified or not, should be reviewed. Whenever appropriate, the no first use policy should be reflected in such writings.
- 3) Biological weapons. For various reasons it seems to me that measures of restraint can and should go farthest in this area.
  - a) no field manuals or other manuals describing offensive use of BW.
  - b) No troop training for offensive use.
  - c) No large scale procurement of BW agent manufacturing facilities, agents or agent storage or transportation facilities.
  - d) No large-scale procurement of special BW agent delivery systems.

Someone with extensive knowledge in this area would certainly be able to do a better job at making concrete suggestions. I would be willing to undertake a closer examination of the problem if the need should arise.

Sincerely yours,

Matthew Meselson