

*Miller*



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ORGANIZATION: Harvard University

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Room:

To: Matt Meselson, Harvard University

(617) 25

From: Marvin Miller. MIT

Re: Possible (hopefully) possible synergism between verification of the CWC and the proposed global convention to ban further production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons

Date: April 11, 1994

Dear Matt:

I enjoyed our conversation about the above as well as other matters, and hope we can do it again in the near future. Re other matters, an article by Edward B. Atkeson, entitled "The Middle East: A Dynamic Military Net Assessment for the 1990s (The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1993, pp. 115-133) contains the following, based on conversations in Israel with military planners:

"Secret, high-technology weapons, the planners believe, will be the key to "befuddlement" of the enemy. These are described as having the "ability to unhinge an enemy offensive at the very outset, within the very first few hours of engagement, and thereby completely upset its original plan." The identity of such a weapon, or weapons, is a matter of some speculation. Whatever form the weapons may take, the achievement of a "befuddling" capability during the three-six-year window of quiescence is considered essential, regardless of cost."

While I don't know whether the above includes chemical agents, and thus is relevant to the concerns which you expressed in the March CWC Bulletin, it reminds me, in spirit, of the proposals which have been advanced by some US weaponeers and others to develop new species of nuclear weapons which eliminate bad people like Saddam Hussein in their underground bunkers with "minimal collateral damage".


Re the advertised subject of this memo, let me remind you that the aim of the fissile material cut-off convention (FMCC) which is being pushed by the Clinton administration is to derive some nuclear non-proliferation benefit from the fact that we and the Russians no longer have any need for more weapons materials. (In fact, the major headache now is to find a safe and secure way to dispose of the material, particularly the plutonium, from dismantled warheads.) Thus, the US government has proposed that both the de jure and the de facto nuclear weapons states stop

producing unsafeguarded plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. The major problem many people have with the convention is that it is silent on the issue of existing stockpiles of weapons materials and /or actual weapons, and thus tends to legitimate their possession by the defacto weapons states (India, Pakistan, and Israel). Supporters of the convention, including me, concede this, but argue that constraining the nuclear programs of the de facto states is very important, even if they retain a weapons capability for some time to come. However, all agree that credible verification of non-production is essential, and here, I think we may have something to learn from the challenge inspection protocols in the CWC. In particular, since it is legitimate under the FMCC for both the de jure and the defacto weapons states to retain both existing stockpiles of fissile materials and tritium as well as the capability to continue to produce the latter, sites where the relevant facilities and stores exist are legitimate candidates for managed access in the manner of the CWC. More generally, since, optimistically, both the CWC and the FMCC will be in force simultaneously in many countries, one needs to think about the relationship between the inspections regimes. That is, challenge inspections under the CWC may turn up nuclear activities which may or not not be prohibited under the FMCC, and vice versa.

At the moment, I am working on the problems involved in persuading the defacto weapons states, particularly Israel, to agree to the FMCC. As I mentioned, Abdullah Toukan doesn't believe that this will be a sufficient quid pro quo to gain acceptance of the CWC by Egypt, Syria and Jordan; he wants Israel to sign the NPT, and delay its implementation for five years or so. While I sympathize with his dissatisfaction with a FMCC as only half a loaf, to my mind it would be a significant half, and there is no possibility of getting Israel to sign the NPT in the near term. Thus, I would like to continue to work on the FMCC, explore the possible synergisms with the CWC with regard to verification, and in the process, maintain a dialogue with Toukan.

It would be nice to do something jointly on this. I could get a reaction from people in the State Department during a trip I have scheduled to Washington next week, but would rather wait until we had a chance to talk again and see if we can come up with a concrete idea. Let me know what you think. Also Tom Wander of the AAAS told me that he had invited you to a meeting in Portugal on June 9-12, 1994 which will discuss future threats to security in the Middle East. I will be giving a paper on weapons of mass destruction in the region; your commentary would be very helpful, and I hope you can come.

Regards,



Marvin Miller