


The Arms
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SENT BY: PETER GIZRUSKI (RESEARCH ANALYST)

Biological Weapons Control: The Third Review and Beyond.

D Synopsis/Description:

This study will examine problems of biological weapons (BW) control. More specifically, it will describe and analyze the results of the upcoming Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), slated to take place in Geneva on the 9-27 September 1991, and its implications for the control of BW in future. The study will pay particular attention to Canada's participation in the Review, and the consideration of what the outcome of the Conference implies for future Canadian BW diplomacy.

The need to strengthen the BW regime has never been greater. Over the past few years, there has been a growing concern that the horizontal proliferation of BW may represent a post-cold war reality to be reckoned with, a fact recently underlined during the Gulf War by fears of Iraq's suspected possession and possible use of BW. Also evident have been increasing worries that new developments in the biological sciences may possess the potential to dramatically increase the military potential and hence, the attractiveness, of BW in future.

Unfortunately, the BWC is presently ill-equipped to deal effectively with such concerns. Not only do its terms fail to prohibit the conduct of research on BW, they also allow for the development and production of such agents for peaceful and protective purposes. Furthermore, the Convention includes no provisions for verification of compliance with its terms, or for enforcement measures in the event of its breach. In short, the BWC places an excessive onus on self-policing by states themselves as a means to insure against the emergence of a BW threat.

The Third Review Conference represents an important vehicle for strengthening the existing BW regime. Indeed, it promises to set the agenda for BW control in the near future, and will provide an important benchmark by which to evaluate subsequent efforts at BW control, both at the international and national levels. As such, its results should be carefully noted and examined.

Clearly, nations with a significant stake in the development of the biological sciences possess an interest in playing an active, constructive role in the process of improving the BWC. This is particularly true in the case of Canada. Indeed, not only has Canada traditionally maintained a strong interest in the control and elimination of chemical and biological weapons, but the current Canadian government has identified biotechnology as a cornerstone technology for future economic development. Consequently, it is especially important that Canada make a concerted effort to ensure that the BWC is strengthened, both to prevent abuses of the biological sciences, and to facilitate their responsible exploitation.

Recent statements by the Canadian government indicate that it intends to be particularly active in its future promotion of BW control. In particular, Canada has stated its intention to promote the convening of a specially mandated Conference, in 1993, to negotiate verification provisions for the BWC. It is likely that the upcoming Review will provide an important

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forum for evaluation of the Canadian proposal. In fact, the Conference and its outcome offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the nature of Canada's overall approach to BW control, and the direction that it could take in the future.

By examining the implications of the Conference for BW control in general and Canadian BW diplomacy in particular, the study will fill important gaps in the literature on biological disarmament. The analysis of past review conferences has been relatively scarce, and of the small body of work that has been done, no study has yet emerged which tailors such an assessment to the role that Canada plays at such reviews, or to the implications of their outcomes for Canadian biological arms control diplomacy.

Objectives: (Item IV).

The principle objective of the project is to make both a scholarly and policy-relevant contribution to the Canadian and international debate on BW control.

On a broader note, the project aims to foster public education of an arms control issue on which there is generally little understanding and knowledge beyond that possessed by a highly specialized audience.

These objectives will not only be facilitated by the publication and dissemination of the study, but through an outreach program which will include the conduct of a seminar at which the study's findings would be presented to the Ottawa academic and policy community, and by publication of a series of op-ed pieces. In all of this, CIIPS financial support would be prominently acknowledged.

Methodology: (Item V).

The project will emphasize the critical analysis of the Third Review Conference of the BWC. Indeed, while some discussion of the past experience of BW control will be undertaken (e.g. comparison of the outcome of the Third Review with those of previous reviews), this will be done with a view to providing the reader with a better grasp of the context of the most recent Conference as well as a deeper understanding of it.

The research effort will proceed through the examination of both scholarly and policy-relevant literature on BW control, government and UN documents, and the conduct of interviews with scholars, policy analysts and government officials - both Canadian and foreign - possessing expertise in the area of BW control. Part of the data collection and interviewing process will involve travel to New York and Washington D.C. for consultation with policy analysts, as well as government officials.

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Efforts are also underway to enable the principle researcher to attend the Third Review, possibly in the capacity of an advisor to the Canadian delegation. The costs of such attendance would however, be covered by Centre funds and/or the Department of External Affairs.

The research team assembled by the Centre to work on this project will help ensure that the work will be of high quality. The principal researcher and writer of the study will be Mr. Peter Gizewski. A Research Analyst at the Centre, Mr. Gizewski is also the author of an earlier Centre study on the subject of biological weapons control. Assisting him will be Mr. John MacLeod, the Centre's Research Assistant.

Research Schedule: (Item VI)

The programme of research described above would be carried out in accordance with the following schedule:

- 1 January 1992 - beginning of project (data collection and analysis).
- 31 March 1992 - completion and limited circulation of 1st draft of report (i.e. to government officials, interested scholars).
- 1 April - 31 May 1992 - completion of final draft
- 1 June 1992 - hold seminar for interested academics, policymakers, media in Ottawa based on study's results.
- 15 June 1992 - publication and circulation of report.

Publication: (Item VII)

The research effort would result in the publication of a report (approximately 25-35 pp.), in the Centre's Issue Brief series.

Budget: (Item VIII) - See Attached

References:

- 1) Dr. John Barrett
Department of External Affairs
Arms Control and Disarmament Division (IDA)
125 Sussex Dr. Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2
Canada

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curriculum vitae du(des) chercheur(s)
- list of publications
liste de publications
- bibliography and review of existing work on the topic
bibliographie et sommaire des recherches sur le sujet
- total budget for the project
budget détaillé pour le projet en entier
- if applicable, progress report on a current contribution from the Fund
le cas échéant, rapport intérimaire et états financier pour la(les) contribution(s) en cours du Fonds
- other material you consider helpful to the review of your project
tout document que vous jugez utile à l'examen de votre demande

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