

APR 8 - 1991

FREDERIC JOSEPH BROWN

April 4 1991

Dear Professor Meselson,

Thanks for the letter and the material. All excellent, particularly the News Chronicle in the CWC Bulletin. I clearly need to become a subscriber - and will.

Regret that I can't accept your kind invitation for 25 April. I will be overseas 20-30 April - guest of the Israeli government. Would like to get together. I am in and out of Cambridge - working with BBN through IDA-DARPA - but nothing scheduled at present. Some other time you will be coming to Washington?

I accept with pleasure your offer to lobby with Princeton Pres. I enclose a copy of my correspondence with them as well as a list of a prospectus of some of the issues I would be prepared to address. Would value your thoughts on any/all of them.

Sincerely
Fred Brown

04/04/91

New Forces Influencing CW Deterrence

While there has been much serious and responsible study of the issues influencing the military employment of chemical weapons in recent years, several contemporary events offer a prospect for important change in the current "calculus" of chemical deterrence. It seems a useful time to assess where we are in the longer view of developing restraints in war. Several "straws in the wind" are:

- Despite broad international consensus about the need for prohibition of chemical weapons in war (CWC), stability of the world order which is both the cause of and the sanction for prohibition is in serious question. The post Cold War alignment is beginning to emerge but profound national discontinuities in military and economic strength and national will to be an international leader (US vs Soviet Union or Russia vs Germany vs Japan in recent months) all point to challenges in codifying prohibition. The Soviet Union alone presents a difficult challenge of national CW control as some Republics strive for independence and terrorist activity against Federal control increases. Reemergent Cold War strains in the Soviet Union threaten needed arms control. Have we been here before post WWI and WWII?

- Yet at the same time an unprecedented UN SC Resolution mandates "... the destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of CW with the immediate practical problems of effective international supervision and on site inspection in Iraq. Theoretical solutions are about to face the challenges of practical execution. Albeit imposed in victory and therefore comparable to post WWI and II more than peacetime treaty execution, we would seem to be about to observe a useful precedent for future actions across the range of arms control.

- Iraq as a rogue state—deterred from use against the Desert Shield coalition and apparently the Kurds etc in the post war internal rebellion yet not deterred against the Iranians or Kurds earlier? What worked or didn't work in each case and why?

- The United States has clear comparative advantage in the employment of brilliant munitions. Is there now a new deterrent means available—a near nuclear (in effects) retaliatory option so powerful that one no longer need hold even a very small CW

"reserve" to deter? Non CW retaliation by Stealth or Cruise Missile - delivered large conventional weapons with a 1 foot CEP is new. Impact on the calculus?

- Assimilation of CW by national military establishments is no more certain today than in the past. Inclosed from the April '91 *ARMY*. It reflects frustration at abiding unwillingness of the US professional force to sustain a chemical "posture". As a personal participant in the formulation of AirLand Battle doctrine-present and future- for Armored Forces, the reluctance was evident. I anticipate more explicit indications of non-assimilation in the near future:

- the chemical battlefield has been studied in great detail by Desert Shield participants. Professional literature will reflect the updated assessments.

- demil of current assets has been a headache as has been compliance with pollution directives over the past decades. From the VA and Agent Orange through personal civil - and possible criminal - liability for pollution facing every military installation commander in the US, all of the "chemical stimuli" to the professional assessments about "chemicals" have been negative.

As indicated, Chemical Warfare would appear as viable a candidate for analysis of the nature of restraints in war today as it was in 1968. But the analysis should build upon not replace the earlier effort just as current incentives and restraints have built upon not replaced. Genuinely exciting times. A longer view by one who has approached the problem intellectually as well as practically for some thirty years would seem useful for an important work.

Incl: a/s

F.J.Brown