

Hammer

12 October, 1980

Dear Ms. McClure/Mr. Wallach

Here is the memo to be sent to Dr. Hammer in Moscow.  
Since I have retained no copy, may I ask you to send me one?  
Thank you very much.

I will also mail to Dr. Hammer in Los Angeles some  
background material on this subject for his possible interest.

Matthew Meselson  
The Biological Laboratories  
Harvard University  
16 Divinity Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Telephone: Office 617-495-2264  
Home 617-876-8676

Sunday, October 12, 1980

TELEX TO DR. ARMAND HAMMER  
C/O OXY MOSCOW OFFICE

FROM: PROFESSOR MATTHEW MESELSON  
THE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
10 DIVINITY AVENUE  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138  
Office Phone (617) 495-2264  
Residence Phone (617) 876-8676

DR. HAMMER:

FOLLOWING GIVEN ME BY PROFESSOR MESELSON FOR TRANSMITTAL TO YOU  
THIS DATE:

QUOTE

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT

IN THE 1950's AND 1960's THE UNITED STATES BUILT A LARGE STOCKPILE OF POISON GAS WEAPONS BASED ON THE SUPER-TOXIC NERVE GASES DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED BUT NOT USED BY GERMANY IN WORLD WAR II. IT IS BELIEVED IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT THE USSR BUILT A SIMILAR STOCKPILE IN THE 1960's. AT THE TIME, THE USSR, BUT NOT THE U.S., WAS A PARTY TO THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, A NO-FIRST-USE TREATY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN 1969, AFTER A DETAILED HIGH-LEVEL REVIEW, PRESIDENT NIXON UNILATERALLY RENOUNCED GERM WEAPONS AND ORDERED U.S. STOCK OF SUCH WEAPONS DESTROYED. U.S. STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE RETAINED. AT THE SAME TIME HE DECLARED HIS INTENTION TO SEEK SENATE SUPPORT FOR U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL. ALSO, HE GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO HALT PRODUCTION OF POISON GAS WEAPONS. THE U.S. ACTUALLY BECAME A PARTY TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL UPON ITS

RATIFICATION BY PRESIDENT FORD IN 1975. AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IN 1974, NIXON AND BREZHNEV DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT TO BAN NOT ONLY THE USE BUT ALSO THE POSSESSION OF GAS WEAPONS. THIS WAS REAFFIRMED BY FORD AND BREZHNEV AT THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT. BILATERAL U.S.-SOVIET TALKS BEGAN IN EARNEST IN SUMMER 1977, WHEN THE U.S. FIRST DEVELOPED A NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE TALKS HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN MATTERS OF DEFINITION, AND AGREEMENT WAS RECENTLY ANNOUNCED (IN JULY 1980) ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THERE IS NO AGREEMENT AS YET, HOWEVER, ON THE SPECIFIC INSPECTION PROCEDURES THEMSELVES.

DURING THE PERIOD SINCE 1969, IT MAY BE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO REFRAINED FROM FURTHER PRODUCTION OF POISON GAS WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH THIS CANNOT BE DETERMINED WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE. THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAVE SAID NOTHING ON THIS SCORE. BOTH THEY AND WE HAVE CONTINUED TO ADD TO OUR DEFENSIVE ANTI-GAS PROTECTIVE CAPABILITIES FOR MILITARY FORCES. NOW, HOWEVER, THERE IS GREAT PRESSURE IN THE U.S. TO RESUME PRODUCTION OF NERVE GAS WEAPONS. EVEN WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND STATE, THE CONGRESS EARLIER THIS MONTH ACTED TO PROVIDE FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT A FACTORY IN ARKANSAS TO PRODUCE A NEW TYPE OF NERVE GAS ARTILLERY SHELL. THIS SHIFT IN CONGRESS IS PARALLELED BY A SIMILAR SHIFT WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BEAUROCRACY. IT REFLECTS THE GENERAL DETERIORATION OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE EFFECT OF UNCONFIRMED BUT WIDELY PUBLICIZED REPORTS THAT THE

SOVIETS HAVE USED GAS IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF OTHER UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SOVIET WORK ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE CITY OF SVERDLOVSK. BEFORE THESE EVENTS, THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT MADE BY THE WHITE HOUSE AGAINST RESUMED U.S. PRODUCTION OF GAS WEAPONS WAS THAT IT WOULD HARM THE PROSPECTS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT. NOW THE GENERAL PERCEPTION IS THAT TOO LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY ON THE INSPECTION ISSUES, TO OFFER MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS.

AT THIS POINT, THE ONLY COURSE LIKELY TO RESTORE THE PROSPECT OF CHEMICAL ARMS-CONTROL WOULD BE FOR THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO TAKE DIRECT PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE MATTER, CUTTING THROUGH THE DEADLOCK AND CONTROVERSY ON LOWER LEVELS. A JOINT REAFFIRMATION OF THE OBJECTIVE OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL BUT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. SOME CONCRETE STEPS TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE WOULD BE NEEDED AT THE SAME TIME. SUCH MOVES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE COORDINATED WITH SOME MUCH BROADER PROGRESS TOWARD IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. INDEED, PROGRESS TOWARD CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT, WHILE DESIRABLE IN ITSELF, COULD ALSO HAVE HIGH SYMBOLIC VALUE AS A PART OF A GENERAL RESTORATION OF BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

UNQUOTE

REGARDS,

FRAN MC CLURE

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SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1980

TELEX TO DR. ARMAND HAMMER  
C/O OXY MOSCOW OFFICE

FROM:  
PROFESSOR MATTHEW MESELSON  
THE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
10 DIVINITY AVENUE  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138  
OFFICE PHONE (617) 495-2264  
RESIDENCE PHONE (617) 876-8676

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