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Dear Matt,

You've done a really excellent job on that CW transcript. I hope the general won't be having too many second thoughts.

Enclosed are copies of pages III-5, III-6 and III-20, on which I've entered revisions of things I said.

On page II-14 there is Lennon quoting a figure of 117,000 for the establishment of the Soviet chemical corps. After one of the sessions I asked him how that number had been reached, and it turned out that it was the upper end of a broad range, the whole estimate being very speculative. Or at least that's what he told me. It would be nice if wording could go into the transcript indicating that the 117,000 was not a confirmed figure.

As to my paper, you remember that I left you with a revised copy to which further revisions would be needed if you decided against publishing the two appendices. I've since had more comments, including some rather cross ones from Deryck Viney, which tempt me to make further revisions (primarily clarifications). Please let me know quite soon what you plan to do, particularly on whether I should try to make my own publishing arrangements for the appendices.

With best wishes,

As ever,

Julian Perry Robinson

motivated by military objectives and are, to various degrees, insulated from the broader social and ethical concerns of the general society. Decoupling certain kinds of research from military programs could be a major long-term benefit of chemical and biological arms control.

ROBINSON: As I indicated in my paper, neither of the two military types of threat mitigation policy -- weapons emphasis or protection emphasis --

provides a counter to the threat of wider assimilation of CW. In my view this is the main argument for placing emphasis on arms control. One can define a threshold below which the degree of assurance provided by an agreement of not being menaced by CW weapons is less than the confidence generated by possessing them. If one keeps <sup>(this threshold)</sup> ~~that concept~~ in mind, one can proceed to

consider how one should ideally adjust the two main negotiating variables of verification and scope. <sup>(But here one has to recognize)</sup> ~~I suggest~~ that it may be awkward, <sup>(even counterproductive)</sup> ~~to specify~~

~~verification measures~~ <sup>(precisely how it should be verified)</sup> in an agreement. One would perhaps be better advised

<sup>(think)</sup> to ~~talk~~ <sup>think</sup> in terms of the verifiability of possible agreements rather than the efficacy of <sup>agreed</sup> verification measures. Those are two very different concepts and

it is important to keep them separate. One might judge that, in view of the

~~relatively~~ marginal significance of chemical weapons in a European confron-

<sup>(to seek to enhance the verifiability of an agreement by writing into it)</sup> ~~tation, it would not be necessary~~ ~~for~~ special verification provisions. ~~to be~~

<sup>(It is true that the possibility of hidden)</sup> ~~written into an agreement.~~ The question of stocks ~~undoubtedly~~ presents a

<sup>(not so much stocks of filled munitions, which deteriorate rather fast, but of bulk agent. Yet</sup>

difficult problem, ~~but~~ <sup>and one might justifiably rely on national technical means detecting the breaking</sup> the process of putting the stocks into munitions is ~~relatively~~ <sup>conspicuous</sup> ~~and therefore could be detected with normal verification~~ <sup>of over-</sup> ~~devices.~~

However, if one broadens the perspective to <sup>embrace</sup> ~~include~~ the objective of <sup>including proliferation,</sup> constraining the assimilation process, ~~I think that one does need special~~

verification provisions written into the treaty. Clearly, a variety of factors contribute to assimilation. Research and development is a major

one, and there is a need for a greater stress on some form of constraint or even control of research and development, <sup>(especially if possession of CW protective equipments is</sup> ~~chemical weapons are indeed allowed~~

<sup>to remain legitimate. Here</sup> ~~to exist in any forthcoming treaty~~ One might perhaps think in terms of quite

simple verification measures, perhaps merely information exchanges on protective activities mediated by a consulting committee of the parties. One would also want to concentrate very carefully on the scope of the chemicals to be covered in the treaty, <sup>particularly as regards the problems presented by riot-control incapacitants.</sup> here, a registry of domestically-used chemical agents could prove useful.

<sup>As to</sup> ~~With regard to the question of proliferation,~~ <sup>itself</sup> it is clear that an agreement that relies or places emphasis on national technical means of various types would offer little in the way of proliferation constraints. Under such circumstances the only constraints one can <sup>envisage</sup> ~~envisage~~ would arise from <sup>the consequences of</sup> public disclosure, <sup>But such</sup> ~~and that~~ disclosure <sup>would often be inimical to</sup> ~~is difficult to assure~~ with national technical <sup>(Instead) one should look to such devices as</sup> means. ~~Perhaps the proposed phosphorus accountability scheme, might serve that purpose.~~

SCOVILLE: Could you explain why you think national technical means or intelligence does not have the capability to verify nonproliferation?

ROBINSON: I assume that indeed it would have some capacity for ascertaining any proliferation taking place. My point was that national technical means might well detect this activity but ~~it will not prevent it, from~~

~~happening.~~ I was looking to the treaty to provide a constraint on the proliferation process. For example, a country might decide that it would be advantageous for its immediate security to buy some nerve gas. This country makes the calculation that national technical means will very likely pick up the activities associated with <sup>acquiring</sup> ~~developing~~ a nerve gas capability. However, it might conclude that it might be able to rely upon a particular political

situation to insure that its activities are not impeded. <sup>For example, it</sup> ~~It~~ was quite evident that chemical weapons were being used in <sup>the</sup> ~~Yemen,~~ <sup>but beyond a token wringing of hands</sup> ~~yet no Western power undertook~~ by the British Government no serious effort was made by outside powers to obstruct that use. ~~to condemn this use of CW as a reprehensible act.~~

MIKULAK: From a technical standpoint, national technical means might be used to pick up proliferation activities, but as a practical matter the United States is not likely to spend much of its time looking for activity in areas which are not of direct concern to its security. If one wants to

*Side of  
Prime Ministers  
Wilson  
condemned  
it?  
M.M.*

LEONARD: There is a no-transfer clause in the EW treaty that I assume could be used as a model for an agreement on chemicals.

GUHIN: There is an indication in the discussion that the proliferation problem is not a serious one which seems to be reflected in a lack of concern about the conversion of industrial agents. While this evaluation may be true with respect to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, I think that the possibility of diversion from the civilian sector may be greater in other countries.

DOTY: Perhaps it would be useful to ask the three participants who prepared papers and today's discussants for final comments.

LENNON: I think that it would be desirable to solicit comments on this document from various sectors. Such an exchange of views would be most helpful to those who are going to be involved in either processing the institutional views or national consultation. In my view this effort can be either a U.S.-Soviet venture after consultation with their allies or a NATO-Warsaw Pact venture. I believe that consultation on technology and techniques of disposal would be a particularly appealing item for the Soviets. We have learned a great deal in the last few years and are presently engaged in considerable research in this area to enable us to accomplish the detoxification more efficiently and more rapidly. This information might be most helpful to the Soviet Union.

ROBINSON: I am pleased that the concept of assimilation seems to have been considered ~~seen as a useful, one, to consider in connection with an analysis of policy options.~~ <sup>after these two days</sup> The overall impression that I am left with/is that while one can spend a great deal of time discussing the variety of possible options and future progress, in fact the situation is one in which ~~one's~~ flexibility is very severely restricted by the realities -- the lifetime of weapons stocks, diplomatic problems of prepositioning stocks, etc. <sup>My only reservation about the</sup> ~~cl...~~ <sup>is that it side-steps the issue of research and development which</sup>