

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
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new file
AmAca
CW Verification
Study

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
Re: CW Verification Study - Ford Foundation

Dear John:

Enclosed is a second draft revised in light of comments from Pete Scoville and Bo Cutter. I am sending it also to Matt, Bernie and Paul who, I hope, will call you promptly if they have any comments.

Best regards.

Sincerely,


George Bunn
Professor of Law

GB:ajs

Enclosure

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
PROPOSAL TO FORD FOUNDATION
ON CBW

Proposal:

- (1) To organize a conference of American experts to consider:
 - (a) the need for an international system to verify compliance with a treaty ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical warfare agents. The need should be appraised in light of (i) the military importance of these agents to the United States for purposes of retaliation given the existence of other weapons (nuclear and conventional) in the American arsenal; (ii) the intelligence information on compliance with such a treaty ban by other countries, information which would be available using existing detection techniques, or could be expected to be made available by improvements in these techniques which may realistically be made in the near future.
 - (b) the general nature and extent of a verification system for such a treaty which should be sought by American negotiators in light of the need determined to exist in 1(a).
- (2) If the experts achieved a consensus, to publish their conclusions, together with necessary background and explanation, in a form understandable to the general public.

Background:

Negotiation of a treaty banning development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological (CB) warfare agents is quite clearly the next step in the CB field after American ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits only the use of CB agents in war. On August 19, 1970, President Nixon resubmitted the Protocol to the U.S. Senate which considered it in 1926 but failed to act upon it. The Senate will hopefully complete action on the Protocol during 1971.

The Geneva Disarmament Conference has already begun looking beyond the Protocol to future steps toward prohibitions of development, production and stockpiling in the CB field. Two draft treaties are before the Conference: that of the Soviet Union and its allies, and that of the United Kingdom.

The Soviet draft would cover both C and B warfare; the UK draft would cover only B warfare (including toxins). The Soviet draft provides only for a national system of self-inspection; that is, each country would be responsible for supervising its own chemical industry to see that no violations occurred. The UK draft provides for a fairly limited procedure for lodging complaints with the United Nations and for the possibility of a UN investigation. But no actual on-site inspection procedures are set forth even in the British draft because of the British view that international verification of a ban on development, production and stockpiling of B weapons would be almost impossible. Moreover, the British contend, since no country would likely retaliate with B weapons if another country used them first, governments should be less concerned with verifying such a ban. When President Nixon unilaterally renounced American production of B weapons, the United States subscribed to this view. American support for the British draft treaty (with minor amendments) followed as a natural consequence.

As a result, if a ban on development, stockpiling and production could be limited to B weapons, the verification problems would probably not hold up negotiations. However, the great majority of participating countries wish to apply the ban to C as well as B weapons. At the same time, the United States and several of its allies have been unwilling to include C weapons in the ban without adequate provision for an effective international verification system. The debate has therefore focussed primarily on methods of detecting the production of C weapons.

Various suggestions for limited forms of international verification were made at the Geneva Conference this year. The United States, however,

took the view that anything less than fairly rigorous on-site, in-the-plant inspection would be inadequate. On the other hand, the Soviet Union contended that a national system of self-inspection, coupled with the possibility of lodging a complaint with the Security Council, was all the verification that anyone should ask. As a result, the Geneva CB negotiations are stalemated.

Research on technical methods of verifying compliance with a ban on development and production of C weapons has been conducted by the Midwest Research Institute (MRI) in the United States. During 1971, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) plans a series of inspection visits in chemical plants in eastern and western European countries (but not the Soviet Union or the United States) using some of the methods developed by MRI. At the recent Pugwash Conference in Fontana, Wisconsin, a Soviet delegate announced that Soviet scientists would participate in the planning and evaluation of the SIPRI studies and experiments. American scientists were already involved.

While the MRI reports and the limited SIPRI field test appear to be useful, they are unlikely alone to convince the American government or the American public that the United States could safely agree to prohibit CW development, production and stockpiling without more rigorous inspection in the Soviet Union than appears to be negotiable.

Explanation of Proposal:

A conference of American experts would appraise the American need for rigorous inspection in light of existing American intelligence information and our primary reliance for deterrence upon nuclear and conventional weapons. Probably the most important new contribution would be an evaluation of the American need for a chemical retaliatory capability given the other weapons in our stockpile. (It is assumed that, in light of the American position with respect to the Geneva Protocol, no chemical capability is necessary

except for retaliatory purposes.)

The group would also consider the kinds of information available through unilateral intelligence on production and deployment of chemical agents. It could then evaluate the MRI reports and the results of the limited SIPRI field test in light of its appraisal of the need for further information than is provided by unilateral intelligence.

Assuming a consensus by a well-chosen panel of American experts, its conclusions should be more persuasive with the American people and the American Government than reports of MRI and SIPRI. These conclusions could be submitted immediately to the Government and incorporated later into a popularized report for the public which would also include background and explanation in non-technical terms.

Manpower Requirements: (See my comments in earlier draft.

We may want to select fairly soon a couple of people to write preliminary papers on (1) the need for a retaliatory capability and (2) the information likely to be available through intelligence. These subjects are not covered by MRI or SIPRI, and the experts should have some sort of working paper to direct their discussion.

Its clear that we need to select people who have the necessary clearances unless we can get the MRI report sanitized (which we can't count on). Pete Scoville feels that we do not need to await the final SIPRI report but could, instead, get information on the results of the field visits shortly after they take place. (My own time is pretty well taken up except for the last week in January, the first week in February and the summer.))